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INTENDED INJURY: TRANSFERRED INTENT AND
RELIANCE IN CLIMATE CHANGE FRAUD
Wes Henricksen*
I. INTRODUCTION
"For an intended injury the law is astute to discover even
very remote causation."
- Justice Thurgood Marshall1
ExxonMobil, the world's largest oil company,2 misled the
public about climate change for at least two decades.3 Several
states' attorneys general have opened investigations into the
potential criminality of the company's conduct.4 The Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) has opened its own
investigation. 5  Criminal or not, however, ExxonMobil's
conduct closely resembles schemes carried out by the tobacco,
* Associate Professor of Law, Barry University School of Law. Thank you to the
participants and discussants at the 2018 Stanford-Penn-Northwestern Junior Faculty Forum
for Law and STEM at Northwestern University School of Law, including Shawn Bayem,
Jason Chin, Bryan Choi, Shari Diamond, Rochelle Dreyfuss, Janet Freilich, Deborah
Hensler, Margot Kaminski, Sarah Lawsky, Mark Lemley, Daniel Linna, Jonathan Masur,
Tracy Pearl, Nicholson Price, Matthew Sag, Harry Surden, Victoria Stodden, David Thaw,
Polk Wagner, Jordan Woods, and Chrisopher Woo. Special thanks to Dean Leticia Diaz
and Barry University School of Law for their support for this article. Thanks to Danielle
Boring and AlaEldean Elmunaier for research assistance.
1. Derosier v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 130 A. 145, 152 (N.H. 1925).
2. In 1998, the Exxon Corporation and Mobil Oil Corporation signed a $80 billion
merger agreement forming a new company called ExxonMobil Corporation, the largest
company in the world at the time. See Allen R. Myerson, Big Oil: The Overview; Exxon
and Mobil Announce $80 Billion Deal to Create World's Largest Company, N.Y. TIMES
(Dec. 2, 1998), [https://perma.cc/4JU8-XEMY]; see also Lauren Debter, The World's
Largest Oil and Gas Companies 2016: Exxon Is Still King, FORBES (May 26, 2016),
[https://perma.cc/JZM9-PUZU]. This article will refer to the company post-merger as
"ExxonMobil," and pre-mergcr as "Exxon."
3. Ivan Penn, California to Investigate Whether Exxon Mobil Lied About Climate-
Change Risks, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 20, 2016), [https://perma.cc/X2DL-9LBY]; John
Schwartz, Exxon Mobil Fraud Inquiry Said to Focus More on Future Than Past, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 19, 2016), [https://perma.cc/EC5J-D79T].
4. Penn, supra note 3; Schwartz, supra note 3.
5. Clifford Krauss, S.E.C. Is Latest to Look into Exxon Mobil's Workings, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 20, 2016), [https://perma.cc/NM8E-RUU9].
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asbestos, opioid, sugar, and leaded gasoline industries, among
others.6 The scheme is always the same: there is a product that
is both profitable and destructive, but its destructiveness is not
readily apparent because the causal connection between the
product and the harm it causes can only be bridged with
scientific knowledge. Moreover, companies selling the product
tell the public that the science linking the product to the harm it
causes is unsettled when, in fact, the science is well-enough
established to warrant regulation of the product and imposition
of liability for harm caused by it.7 The corporate message of
6. See, e.g., PAUL BRODEUR, OUTRAGEOUS MISCONDUCT: THE ASBESTOS
INDUSTRY ON TRIAL 14-18 (1985); NAOMI ORESKES & ERIK M. CONWAY, MERCHANTS
OF DOUBT: HOW A HANDFUL OF SCIENTISTS OBSCURED THE TRUTH ON ISSUES FROM
TOBACCO SMOKE TO GLOBAL WARMING 14, 24, 33 (2010); James A. Henderson, Jr. &
Aaron D. Twerski, Reaching Equilibrium in Tobacco Litigation, 62 S.C. L. REv. 67, 70
(2010); Lester Brickman, On the Theory Class's Theories of Asbestos Litigation: The
Disconnect Between Scholarship and Reality, 31 PEPP. L. REv. 33, 35, 41 (2003); Martha
McCabe, Pesticide Law Enforcement: A View from the States, 4 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 35,
51 (1989); William R. Freudenburg et al., Scientific Certainty Argumentation Methods
(SCAMs): Science and the Politics of Doubt, 78 SOC. INQUIRY 2, 16 (2008); Jerome 0.
Nriagu, Clair Patterson and Robert Kehoe 's Paradigm of "Show Me the Data" on
Environmental Lead Poisoning, 78 ENVTL. RES. 71, 73 (1998); Lynne Peeples, Fracking
Industry Distorts Science to Deceive Public and Policymakers, Says Watchdog Group,
HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 21, 2015), [https://perma.cc/LFS3-NSAA]; Jamie Lincoln
Kitman, The Secret History of Lead, THE NATION (Mar. 2, 2000), [https://perma.cc/22ZT-
GW97].
7. Recently, other such schemes have come to light. See, e.g., Cristin E. Kearns et
al., Sugar Industry and Coronary Heart Disease Research: A Historical Analysis of
Internal Industry Documents, JAMA INTERNAL MED. (Nov. 1, 2016),
[https://perma.cc/3DJX-KNNL]. For instance, the sugar industry paid Harvard-affiliated
researchers to publish papers downplaying the link between sugar and heart disease and
obesity, directing blame instead to saturated fat. Id. The sugar industry's misinformation
campaign shaped fifty years of health policy in the United States. Anahad O'Connor, How
the Sugar Industry Shifted the Blame to Fat, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 12, 2016),
[https://perma.cc/ELJ2-75PE]. Similarly, a 2016 New York Times article revealed that
Coca-Cola paid millions of dollars for research downplaying the link between sugary
drinks and obesity. Anahad O'Connor, Coca-Cola Funds Scientists Who Shift Blame for
Obesity Away from Bad Diets, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 9, 2015), [https://perma.cc/44AQ-42KL].
Even more recently, the Missouri Attorney General filed a lawsuit against three opioid
drug manufacturers, seeking hundreds of millions of dollars in damages and alleging that
the companies funded a "campaign of fraud and deception" by misleading doctors and
consumers about opioids' addictiveness and adverse health effects. Katie Mettler, In
Lawsuit, Missouri Says Big Pharma Caused Opioid Crisis with 'Campaign of Fraud and
Deception,' WASH. POST (June 22, 2017), [https://perma.cc/CYW8-6CBV]. Similar
lawsuits have been filed in Mississippi and Ohio. Jerry Mitchell, Mississippi Sets Tone as
Opioid Drugmakers Face Rising Tide of Lawsuits, CLARION-LEDGER (June 10, 2017),
[https://perma.cc/L4WV-9RKE]; Efthimios Parasidis, A Look Inside Ohio's Lawsuit
Against Opioid Manufacturers, SALON (July 7, 2017), [https://perma.cc/UH6A-8AYG].
2020 INTENDED INJURY 715
scientific doubt, in other words, does not square with what
scientists know, making the assertion misleading, if not illegal.
These false assertions are also terrifyingly harmful. The
damages caused by the tobacco, opioid, and sugar industries'
deceptions are well-documented.8 This is not yet the case with
regard to the fossil fuel industry's deceptions. But that is rapidly
changing.
A growing number of individuals and communities are
coming forward with claims to redress damages caused by
global warming. 9 This growing body of climate litigation
includes, to date, more than 1,000 cases, including more than
800 in the United States alone, and more than 250 cases in 25
other countries. 10 Based on the nature of the global warming
threat, however, the number of climate litigation suits will likely
balloon in the coming years and decades, particularly "private
climate litigation"'" lawsuits against greenhouse gas (GHG)
emitters and energy companies. Many more plaintiffs will be
harmed in the next hundred years by sea level rise, heatwaves,
extreme weather events, stronger storm surges, coastal and
inland flooding, drought, more frequent and devastating
wildfires, and population displacement, among other effects.' 2
8. See Kearns, supra note 7 (sugar); Mettler, supra note 7 (opioid); Henderson &
Twerski, supra note 6, at 70 (tobacco).
9. See 3 ENVTL. INS. LITIG.: L. & PRAC. § 27:16 (2019) ("There are, thus far, three
distinct, basic types of global warming litigation: statutory global warming litigation,
common law tort based global warming litigation, and preemption global warming
litigation.").
10. Geetanjali Ganguly et al., If at First You Don't Succeed: Suing Corporations for
Climate Change, 38 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 841, 843 (2018). U.S. and non-U.S. cases
are listed in the Climate Litigation Database maintained by the Sabin Center for Climate
Change Law. Climate Change Litigation Databases, SABIN CTR. FOR CLIMATE CHANGE
L., [https://perma.cc/K3QS-WBJC]. Non-U.S. cases can also be found in the Climate
Change Laws of the World database maintained by the Grantham Research Institute on
Climate Change and the Environment, at the London School of Economics and Political
Science, jointly with the Sabin Center. Climate Change Laws of the World, GRANTHAM
RES. INST. ON CLIMATE CHANGE & ENV'T, [https://perma.cc/9F5X-8V5T]. These
databases are comprehensive but may not contain all climate litigation cases.
11. Private climate litigation comprises lawsuits against corporations, while public
climate litigation comprises lawsuits against governments. See Ganguly et al., supra note
10, at 843.
12. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2014:
SYNTHESIS REPORT 65-67 (Rajendra K. Pachauri et al. eds., 2014) [hereinafter CLIMATE
CHANGE 2014].
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Current tort law provides no viable avenue for such
plaintiffs to seek redress for climate change damages against
those responsible for causing the harm. 13  A number of private
climate litigation claims have been brought under nuisance,
14
and a handful of plaintiffs have brought fraud claims.
15
Although a nuisance claim has survived the pleading stage in
one case in Germany, 16  American courts have, to date,
dismissed these kinds of tort claims on standing grounds. 17 This
is not, of course, the end of the story for tort claims against
fossil fuel companies or GHG emitters. If the history of tobacco
litigation is any guide, and a number of authors have asserted it
13. Some progress is being made on this front, however. For instance, in the case of
Urgenda Foundation v. the State of the Netherlands, the plaintiffs argued that by not
regulating and curbing Dutch GHG emissions, the State committed the tort of negligence
against its citizens. See Rb. Den Haag 24 juni 2015, 2015, 7196 m.nt. (Urgenda
Foundation/Kingdom of the Netherlands) (Neth.), [https://perma.cc/4459-3F46]. For a
discussion of the case, see Myanna Dellinger, See You in Court: Around the World in Eight
Climate Change Lawsuits, 42 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REv. 525, 533-36 (2018)
(discussing the human rights components of the Urgenda case and briefly mentioning its
torts components); R. Henry Weaver & Douglas A. Kysar, Courting Disaster: Climate
Change and the Adjudication of Catastrophe, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 295, 331-41 (2017)
(discussing duty, breach, causation, and damages under Urgenda). In the U.S., a handful
of Californian cities sued five major fossil fuel companies for public nuisance in September
2017. See Complaint, People v. BP P.L.C., No. CGC-17-561370 (Super. Ct. S.F. Cty.
Sept. 19, 2017) (San Francisco); Complaint, People v. BP P.L.C., No. RG-17875889
(Super. Ct. Alameda Cty. Sept. 19, 2017) (Oakland). Similarly, San Mateo and Marin
Counties, as well as the City of Imperial Beach, sued thirty-seven fossil fuel companies for
their roles in sea-level rise in July 2017, bringing claims for public nuisance and
negligence. See Complaint, Cty. of San Mateo v. Chevron Corp., No. 17-CIV-03222
(Super. Ct. San Mateo Cty. July 17, 2017). It is uncertain at this time what, if any, relief
the plaintiffs in these lawsuits will be awarded.
14. See, e.g., Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 696 F.3d 849, 853 (9th
Cir. 2012); Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 585 F.3d 855, 860 (5th Cir. 2009); Order, OLG,
Nov. 30, 2017, 2 0 285/15, rhttps://perma.cc/RQ7Q-8BDW1. For a summary of Lliuya v.
RWE AG, see Lliuya v. RWE AG, SABIN CTR. FOR CLIMATE CHANGE L.,
[https://perma.cc/92NV-EVDS].
15. See, e.g., Comer, 585 F.3d at 859-60, 869.
16. Order, OLG, Nov. 30, 2017, 2 0 285/15, [httys://perma.cc/R07Q-8BDW;
Lliuya v, RWE, GRANTHAM RESEARCH INST. ON CLIMATE CHANGE & ENV'T,
[https://perma.cciNPX6-XREQ] ("While the facts of this case must still be adjudicated, the
court's recognition that a private company could potentially be held liable for the climate
change related damages of its greenhouse gas emissions marks a significant development
in law.").
17. See, e.g., Native Vill. of Kivalina, 696 F.3d at 869; Comer, 585 F.3d at 879-80;
see also Elizabeth Dubats, An Inconvenient Lie: Big Tobacco Was Put on Trial for Denying
the Effects of Smoking; Is Climate Change Denial Off-Limits?, 7 Nw. J. L. & SOC. POL'Y
510, 520-25 (2012).
2020 INTENDED INJURY 717
most certainly is,1 8 tort claims against fossil fuel companies will
be allowed to move forward only after the deceptive practices of
the fossil fuel companies are finally recognized as criminally
fraudulent. It was not until 2006 that the tobacco industry was
found to have conspired to carry out a scheme to defraud the
public and consumers in United States v. Philip Morris USA,
Inc.1 9 Up to then, no plaintiff had succeeded in bringing a fraud
claim against a tobacco company in U.S. court.2 ° Since 2006,
there have been a number of fraud claims, some of them
successful.2 1
Standing is undoubtedly an important issue for climate
change tort plaintiffs. However, although it has been explored
by a handful of authors,22 the fast pace of development in this
area means it is anyone's guess as to how courts will view this
issue in ten or twenty years. At present, the picture looks bleak
for private climate litigation tort plaintiffs, at least in the short-
term. The Supreme Court in American Electric Power Co. v.
Connecticut (AEP) 23 ruled that common law claims were
displaced by the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA)
authority to regulate GHG emissions under the Clean Air Act
(CAA).2 4 The Ninth Circuit in Native Village of Kivalina v.
18. See, e.g., Dubats, supra note 17, at 512; Angela Lipanovich, Smoke Before Oil:
Modeling a Suit Against the Auto and Oil Industry on the Tobacco Tort Litigation Is
Feasible, 35 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 429, 431 (2005) ("The principles learned from the
tobacco litigation may be used to recoup private and public expenditures from the petro
industry for harm caused by use of their products.").
19. See United States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 449 F. Supp. 2d 1, 852 (D.D.C.
2006).
20. Dubats, supra note 17, at 512, 514.
21. See, e.g., Falise v. Am. Tobacco Co., 94 F. Supp. 2d 316, 355 (E.D.N.Y. 2000);
Schoeff v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 232 So. 3d 294, 298-99 (Fla. 2017); CHARLES J.
NAGY, JR., AM. L. PROD. LIAB. 3d § 88:16 (2019).
22. See, e.g., Hari M. Osofsky, Litigation's Role in the Path of U.S. Federal Climate
Change Regulation: Implications of AEP v. Connecticut, 46 VAL. U. L. REv. 447, 452
(2012); Michael B. Gerrard, 'American Electric Power' Leaves Open Many Questions for
Climate Litigation, N.Y. L.J. (July 14, 2011), [https://perma.cc/X82U-MX9J] (stating that
the standing portion of the AEP case "did not set precedent in the technical sense");
Bradford C. Mank, Standing for Private Parties in Global Warming Cases: Traceable
Standing Causation Does Not Require Proximate Causation, 2012 MICH. ST. L. REV. 869,
870-71 (2012).
23. Am. Elec. Power Co., Inc. v. Connecticut (AEP), 564 U.S. 410,424 (2011).
24. See id.; Hari M. Osofsky, AEP v. Connecticut's Implications for the Future of
Climate Change Litigation, 121 YALE L.J. ONLINE 101, 102 (2011),
[https://perma.cc/MBZ7-ZU5R] ("In AEP, the Court shape[d] the path of climate change
litigation by reinforcing the appropriateness of regulatory actions while limiting federal
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ExxonMobil Corp. (Kivalina)25 held that the CAA displaced
public nuisance claims.26 According to one author, collectively
AEP and Kivalina "might spell the end of climate change tort
litigation in the federal courts." 27 But while this may very well
be the case today, tomorrow is another day. There are myriad
ways the picture could change for private climate litigation
plaintiffs. Given the growing global movement to take action on
climate change, it is conceivable, perhaps even highly likely,
that communities and individuals harmed by climate change will
soon be given the opportunity to seek redress in the common
law for their harms. One way this could happen would be by
Congress removing the EPA's authority to regulate GHG
emissions. Were that to happen, common law claims would no
longer be displaced under AEP and Kivalina.
28
When this happens-for I believe this to be a question not
of if but when-plaintiffs suing corporations for climate change
fraud will face obstacles far greater than those suing in
nuisance. 29  This is a problem. In climate damages litigation,
nuisance is an inadequate substitute for fraud. Nuisance seeks
common law public nuisance ones.").
25. Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp. (Kivalina), 696 F.3d 849 (9th Cir.
2012).
26. Id. at 858.
27. See Quin M. Sorenson, Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp.: The
End of "Climate Change" Tort Litigation?, ABA (Jan. 1, 2013), [https://perma.cc/K4CC-
CJDA].
28. See, e.g., HARI M. OSOFSKY & LESLEY K. MCALLISTER, CLIMATE CHANGE
LAW AND POLICY 118 ("The Court's decision in AEP left open the door to federal common
law nuisance suits in a scenario in which Congress eliminates the EPA's regulatory
authority over greenhouse gas emissions under the Clean Air Act."); LONDON SCH. ECON.
& POLITICAL SCI. DEP'T LAW, Climate Change Litigation: Courts to the Rescue?,
YouTUBE (Mar. 23, 2017), [https://perma.cc/RU7S-MTWL] ("The nuisance pathway in
the United States has not been successful to date, in part because of the Supreme Court
decision in AEP v. Connecticut. But this also potentially changes under the Trump
administration, depending on what our Congress does.... [T]he AEP v. Connecticut
decision .. . always left a door open, that if the EPA's authority to regulate under the Clean
Air Act ever gets taken away, that pathway potentially reopens.") [hereinafter LSE LAW].
29. The obstacles faced by climate-change-fraud plaintiffs include the fact that "the
First Amendment seemingly shields these distorters and misinformcrs." James Parker-
Flynn, The Fraudulent Misrepresentation of Climate Science, 43 ENVTL. L. REP. 11098,
11099 (2013). A handful of authors have explored this issue. See, e.g., James Weinstein,
Climate Change Disinformation, Citizen Competence, and the First Amendment, 89 U.
COLO. L. REv. 341, 369-71 (2018); Shannon M. Roesler, Evaluating Corporate Speech
About Science, 106 GEO. L.J. 447,450-51 (2018). The focus of this article, however, is on
tort law. The First Amendment aspects need not, and will not, be addressed.
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redress for only one component of the bad behavior of fossil fuel
companies and other GHG emitters-namely, the act of emitting
CO 2 into the atmosphere. 30 Although it is important that GHG
emitters be held accountable for their CO 2 emissions, nuisance
ignores the misrepresentations by the fossil fuel industry and its
allies, which manipulated the public into allowing the emissions
in the first place.
Those harmed by global warming, like those harmed by
tobacco, should be allowed to bring a civil fraud action against
those whose misrepresentations caused their harm. But
plaintiffs alleging fraud against fossil fuel companies, even if
allowed to do so,31 would face insurmountable hurdles that
typical fraud plaintiffs do not. First, because the existence,
causes, and ramifications of global warming are matters of
scientific knowledge, plaintiffs in climate change fraud cases
face enormous difficulties establishing the falsity of the
defendant's misrepresentations. 32  My prior scholarship
addressed this shortcoming in the law. 33
Falsity is only the beginning of plaintiffs' problems in these
cases, however. Intent, reliance, causation, and damages are
other elements that also present significant obstacles for
plaintiffs. This article addresses intent and reliance, each a
required element of fraud.34  Plaintiffs suing fossil fuel
companies for fraud can almost never establish these elements. 35
Part of the problem is the panoply of difficulties faced by
plaintiffs bringing any kind of climate litigation action.36 But
one problem unique to climate change fraud plaintiffs is the fact
that companies like ExxonMobil, who led the campaign of
30. 1 KAREN A. GOTTLIEB, Toxic TORTS PRAC. GUIDE § 6:4 (2019) (public
nuisance elements); 17A CHRISTINE M. G. DAVIS ET AL., CARMODY-WAIT 2d § 107:44
(2019) (private nuisance elements).
31. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
32. See Wes E. Henricksen, Scientific Knowledge Fraud, 97 OR. L. REV. 307, 310-12
(2019) [hereinafter Henricksen, Scientific Knowledge Fraud]; Wes E. Henricksen,
Peddling Ignorance: A New Falsity Standard for Scientific Knowledge Fraud Cases, 86
UMKC L. REV. 295, 319 (2017) [hereinafter Henricksen, Peddling Ignorance].
33. See, e.g., Henricksen, Scientific Knowledge Fraud, supra note 32.
34. Gutierrez v. Cayman Islands Firm of Deloitte & Touche, 100 S.W.3d 261, 273
(Tex. App. 2002); 37 C.J.S. Fraud § 50 (2019).
35. See Parker-Flynn, supra note 29, at 11107.
36. These include, for instance, cumulative emissions since the Industrial Revolution,
multiple emitters, scientific uncertainty, diffuse impacts, deferred impacts, and social and
political factors. LSE Law, supra note 28.
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climate change denial, made its misrepresentations to the public
at large.37 The vast majority of those harmed by global warming
misrepresentations are not harmed as a result of personally
relying on those misrepresentations. 38  This is true even though
the exact kind of injury suffered by the plaintiff may very well
have been foreseen, or even intended, as the end result of the
misrepresentations. 39 This is because the misrepresentations are
meant to sway public opinion and political action in a way that
allows avoidance of government regulation and court liability.4 °
Those harmed are effectively barred from seeking redress in
fraud.4'
The result? Although the fossil fuel industry purposefully
misled the public about global warming for at least two decades,
resulting in massive and widespread reliance on their
misrepresentations and omissions by political leaders,
government agencies, and courts, 4 2 any individual who suffers
37. One author aptly described the bind climate change fraud plaintiffs face with
regard to the reliance element:
For private plaintiffs, this is a philosophically impassible roadblock. How
could a climate change victim show that he or she relied on the
misrepresentations of a think tank or scientist? Would the victim first have
to prove that he or she actually heard the misrepresentation, and then
changed his or her actions accordingly? Moreover, what kind of changes in
behavior would suffice to establish reliance? Would voting or purchasing
habits suffice? What if the person had always voted for politicians that
support action on climate change, and had never bought from the underlying
source of emissions, but for completely unrelated reasons? Could the victim
be said to have relied on the misrepresentation? Indeed, the challenge of
establishing both causation and reliance would likely bar any possible
recovery for fraudulent misrepresentation of climate science. Because fraud
has stringent reliance, causation, damages, and falsity requirements, it simply
does not provide a valuable framework in which to address climate science
distortion.
Parker-Flynn, supra note 29, at 11107.
38. Seeid. atlllO0.
39. See id. at 11104.
40. In the case of the fossil fuel industry, the end goal of the campaign of climate
change doubt was to avoid regulation of fossil fuel extraction, production, sales, and use, as
well as to avoid liability for any harm caused by global warming. See, e.g., ORESKES &
CONWAY, supra note 6; Coral Davenport & Eric Lipton, How G.O.P. Leaders Came to
View Climate Change as Fake Science, N.Y. TIMES (June 3, 2017),
[https://perma.cc/5 P6X-ANW7].
41. Parker-Flynn, supra note 29, at 11107.
42. The scale of the political reliance on the fossil fuel industry's misrepresentations
is staggering. To give a recent example, in the 2016 election, $70 million of "outside
group" money was spent to help elect Republican Senate candidates in Ohio, Indiana, and
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damage as a result of global warming ends up effectively barred
from bringing a fraud claim against the fossil fuel companies
and other industry groups to hold them accountable for the
deception.43  Fraud, also called deceit or intentional
misrepresentation, developed precisely to provide redress in a
civil action for damages suffered as a result of intentional
deceit. 44 Those harmed by climate change deception schemes
are squarely within the class of individuals fraud laws were
intended to protect.45 Under the current fraud laws, however,
these plaintiffs are left without an opportunity to seek
compensation for damages caused by the companies whose
deception caused global warming and, therefore, the plaintiffs'
injury. 6 This gap in the law has been noted by other authors.4 7
This article posits that one way to close this gap, though
certainly not the only way,48 would be to apply a transferred
Wisconsin, ensuring Republicans retained control of the chamber. Sheldon Whitehouse,
Time to Wake Up: 2018 Year in Review, MEDIUM (Jan 10, 2019), [https://perma.cc/WV6R-
WFKU]. Of that total, at least $46 million was directly traceable to fossil fuel industry
groups. Id. Another $12 million in "dark money" appears to be tied to fossil fuel interests
as well. Id. These contributions, in addition to the lobbying campaign aimed at Congress
and propaganda campaign aimed at the public, have, to date, allowed fossil fuel companies
to avoid government regulation and court liability.
It is worth noting, as well, that many members of the public also rely on the fossil fuel
industry's deceptive messages. Many have relied on the oil industry's representations and
omissions by purchasing property, building homes, and choosing where to live, as well as
by voting for political candidates that parrot, and work to further, the fossil fuel industry's
climate change denial message and agenda.
43. Parker-Flynn, supra note 29, at 11107.
44. 37 AM. JUR. 2d Fraud and Deceit § 28 (2013).
45. See Pasley v. Freeman (1789), 100 Eng. Rep. 450, 451 (KB).
46. Parker-Flynn, supra note 29, at 11105, 11109.
47. See, e.g., id. at 11099 (advocating that "the United States should adopt a
narrowly tailored civil cause of action for the fraudulent misrepresentation of climate
science"); Weinstein, supra note 29, at 374 (arguing that the First Amendment would, with
proper safeguards, permit sanctions for commercial harms resulting from ExxonMobil's
alleged disinformation campaign); Dubats, supra note 17, at 510, 536 (arguing that there is
no legally relevant difference between the tobacco fraud and climate change fraud claims
that would justify justiciability in one instance and not the other); see also William C.
Tucker, Deceitful Tongues: Is Climate Change Denial a Crime?, 39 ECOLOGY L. Q. 831,
832, 836 (2012) (examining whether climate change denial "can be regarded as a crime
based not just upon the unethical motives of its perpetrators, but on its effects").
48. One other possible solution would be Parker-Flynn's suggestion of a new tort
cause of action for misrepresentation of climate change science. Parker-Flynn, supra note
29, at 11099. Another possible solution would be to treat public deceptions the way
securities law treats fraud on the market, by inferring reliance by the fact that the
representation was made to the public. See John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky,
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intent doctrine to climate change fraud cases. Such a doctrine
would kill two birds with one stone by allowing plaintiffs to
establish intent and reliance where the plaintiffs injury arose
not on account of her own reliance on the misrepresentation, but
on account of the reliance by others from whom the defendant
intended to induce action. This proposal, though novel, is
supported by the well-established tort policy.
49
The article proceeds in three parts. In Part I, I discuss the
intent and reliance elements and how their application in climate
change fraud cases would result in injustice if a such a fraud
claim were to be addressed on its merits in court. In Part II, I
describe how the transferred intent doctrine developed to
provide for redress in cases where tort law traditionally left
plaintiffs empty handed. I also draw parallels between the gap
in the law of trespassory torts filled by the transferred intent
doctrine and the current gap in the fraud law with regard to
climate change deception claims. In Part III, I propose that a
doctrine based on transferred intent be applied to climate change
fraud cases. I also address counterarguments to the proposal.
This transferred intent and reliance doctrine, if applied in
climate change fraud cases, would be a substantial step toward
holding companies like those in the fossil fuel industry liable for
misrepresentations made to the public that resulted in actual or
threatened harm to individuals who did not necessarily
themselves rely on the misrepresentations but were nonetheless
foreseeably injured by them. Climate change fraud claims are
almost certainly going to increase significantly in the coming
few decades, for instance, by those whose property has been
damaged or destroyed by sea level rise or other climate-change-
caused phenomena resulting from global warming. As many
other industries have also carried out similar schemes,5 0 the
application of the proposed doctrine reaches far beyond cases
against the fossil fuel industry.
The Fraud-on-the-Market Tort, 66 VAND. L. REV. 1755, 1761-62 (2013) (exploring the
role of fraud-on-the market in the context of "impersonal deccits" in tort).
49. See infra Section 111.0.
50. Parker-Flynn, supra note 29, at 11103; Nic Fleming, Why Is Asbestos Still
Killing People?, PAC. STANDARD (June 14, 2017), [https://perma.cc/ZG33-T5HJ].
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H. INTENT AND RELIANCE IN CLIMATE CHANGE
FRAUD
A. The Role of Intent in Commercial Public Deception
Intent, a required fraud element, normally requires that a
fraud plaintiff prove the defendant intended to induce reliance
by the plaintiff specifically. 51  The RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
states that a defendant "who makes a fraudulent
misrepresentation is subject to liability to the persons or class of
persons whom he intends or has reason to expect to act or to
refrain from action in reliance upon the misrepresentation, for
pecuniary loss suffered by them through justifiable reliance." 52
This intent requirement is echoed in jurisprudence throughout
the United States.53
The intent requirement reflects the one-on-one nature of
fraud, traditionally. It is a cause of action that arose largely out
of one-on-one deceptions. 54 However, the scope of the intent
requirement has not been well-explored. Interestingly, the very
same RESTATEMENT (SECOND) provision that provides that
hornbook definition of the intent element also provides a caveat:
"The Institute expresses no opinion on whether the liability of
the maker of a fraudulent representation may extend beyond the
rule stated in this Section to other persons or other types of
transactions, if reliance upon the representation in acting or in
refraining from action may reasonably be foreseen."55
Notwithstanding this caveat, however, most courts have
interpreted the intent element as requiring either specific intent
to induce a particular person or class of persons to rely on the
misrepresentation, or knowledge to a substantial certainty that
such reliance will occur. 56
51. See Bd. Of Educ. of Chi. v. A, C & S, Inc., 546 N.E.2d 580, 591 (111. 1989); 37
AM. JUR. 2d Fraud and Deceit § 28 (2013).
52. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 531 (AM. LAW INST. 1977).
53. See id. ("One who makes a fraudulent misrepresentation is subject to liability to
the persons or class of persons whom he intends or has reason to expect to act or to refrain
from action in reliance upon the misrepresentation.").
54. See infra note 78 and accompanying text.
55. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 531 (emphasis added).
56. See, e.g., Bank of Valley v. Mattson, 339 N.W.2d 923, 927 (Neb. 1983) (noting
that one who made a fraudulent misrepresentation was liable to the class of persons on
whom he intended to induce reliance); MEGA Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 92
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This interpretation of the intent element works perfectly
well for one-on-one deceptions. For commercial public
deceptions, however, such as those by the tobacco, opioid, and
sugar industries, requiring intent to induce reliance by a
particular individual or class of individuals becomes more
problematic. A plaintiff suing the sugar industry, for instance,
would almost certainly not be able to prove intent because the
sugar manufacturers and industry representatives did not direct
their misrepresentations and omissions at any particular member
of the public. And being a member of the public harmed by a
product is very commonly grounds to dismiss a fraud claim.
57
Plaintiffs suing tobacco, opioid, and other industry defendants
that have carried out commercial public deceptions face similar
high hurdles on the intent element. As will be discussed below,
plaintiffs in climate change fraud claims face far greater
obstacles than do plaintiffs suing other kinds of commercial
public deception fraud defendants.
58
B. The Role of Reliance in Commercial Public Deception
Reliance, like intent, is also a required fraud element. 59 To
prevail in a fraud claim, a plaintiff must prove not only that the
defendant made a material, factual misrepresentation intended to
deceive, but also that that plaintiff reasonably relied on the
apparent truthfulness of the misrepresentation. 60  Accordingly,
the absence of reliance is grounds for dismissal of a fraud claim,
even if there is a causal connection between the defendant's
misrepresentation and the plaintiff's injury.
6 1
Cal. Rptr. 3d 399, 405 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009) (holding that a fraud defendant owed no duty
to a person who was not the prospective party to the transaction in which fraud was
alleged).
57. See, e.g., Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 585 F.3d 855, 867-68 (5th Cir. 2009)
(holding that landowners failed to identify a particularized injury that would affect them in
a personal and individual way and that claims presented generalized grievances common to
all citizens or litigants in United States); Pub. Citizen, Inc. v. Bomer, 274 F.3d 212, 219
(5th Cir. 2001) (holding that "no matter how well intended, Plaintiffs have done little more
than present a generalized grievance, common to all citizens or litigants in Texas, and as
such, lack standing").
58. See infra Sections 1.0 and 1.0.
59. Hunt v. U.S. Tobacco Co., 538 F.3d 217, 226' (3d Cir. 2008); Bd. of Educ. of
Chicago v. A, C & S, Inc., 546 N.E.2d 580, 591 (Il1. 1989).
60. A, C & S. Inc., 546 N.E.2d at 591.
61. See, e.g., Khan v. CitiMortgage Inc., 975 F. Supp. 2d 1127, 1139, 1141 (E.D. Cal.
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Reliance, however, presents a far more complex
conundrum for climate change fraud plaintiffs than does intent,
in part because the reliance element is something of an enigma
even to tort scholars. 62 To understand how reliance fits into the
climate change fraud picture, it is first necessary to explore, at
least briefly, where reliance came from and what its purpose is.
The question is, given that the fossil fuel industry's climate
change deceptions are made to the public rather than to any
particular individual and cause harm primarily to individuals
who did not rely directly on the deceptions, does the existence of
the reliance element mean such deceptions can never subject the
speaker to fraud liability by those harmed by the deceptions?
1. How Reliance Developed in the One-on-One Fraud Context
Present-day fraud traces its origins back to a writ on the
case dating to 1201, which was available against only those who
misused the legal system to the plaintiffs detriment.6 3 Over the
next few centuries, the writ was expanded to cover fraudulent
transactions, a branch of deceit termed "breach of warranty., 64
However, prior to 1789, this tort never broadened beyond the
bounds of contractual relations. 65  Breach of warranty claims
were available only to individuals deceived by someone with
whom they had entered into a contract.66 Accordingly, the
breach of warranty action was closer to what we today call
breach of contract.
Because of its strong link to contractual relations, deceit
was not recognized as a distinct tort until the 1789 case of
2013).
62. See, e.g., John C.P. Goldberg et al., The Place of Reliance in Fraud, 48 ARIZ. L.
REv. 1001, 1001-04 (2006).
63. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS
726-27 (5th ed. 1984); WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 105, at
685 (4th ed. 1971) (noting that the writ of deceit was originally narrow, permitting only an
action against a defendant who manipulated legal procedure to defraud another).
64. 10 STUART M. SPEISER ET AL., THE AMERICAN LAW OF TORTS § 32:3 (2012)
(citing Mother Earth, Ltd. v. Strawberry Camel, Ltd., 390 N.E.2d 393, 400 (Ill. App. Ct.
1979)).
65. KEETON ET AL., supra note 63, § 105, at 685; see also 2 FOWLER V. HARPER ET
AL., HARPER, JAMES AND GRAY ON TORTS § 7.1 (3d ed. 2006).
66. KEETON ET AL., supra note 63, § 105, at 685.
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Pasley v. Freeman.67  There, the plaintiff and defendant were
not in contractual privity with one another, and the King's
Bench court recognized that no tort existed to hold the defendant
liable. 68  Chief Justice Lord Kenyon noted, however, that "the
defendant's conduct was highly immoral, and detrimental to
society."69 The court went on to invent the tort we now call
fraud by holding the defendant nevertheless liable.
7 0
The ruling in the Pasley case by the King's Bench has been
quoted, cited, followed, and approved in numerous modem
American cases that fully implement the basic principle that
deceit was, and is, a distinct tort.71  This marked a fork in the
development of the law, with breach of warranty actions going
in the direction of contract law, 2 and deceit going in the
direction of tort.73  "Thereafter, the two actions followed a
generally divergent evolution, the distinction being that, in the
tort action for deceit, knowledge or some equivalent of
knowledge of the falsity of the statement is required as well as
67. Pasley v. Freeman (1789) 100 Eng. Rep. 450, 450, 453, 457-58 (KB). There,
John Pasley, the owner of a store, received a large order for goods on credit by a customer
he did not personally know. Id. at 450. Pasley spoke with Joseph Freeman, an individual
acquainted with the customer, to ask whether the customer was creditworthy. Id. Freemen
knew the customer could not be trusted to pay for the goods, but he nevertheless urged
Pasley to sell the goods to the customer and falsely asserted that the customer was
trustworthy. Id. Pasley delivered the goods to the customer and the customer never paid.
Id. Upon the default, Pasley brought an action at law for deceit against Freeman. Id. at
450-51. The majority held, for the first time, that purposefully misleading another to the
other's financial detriment creates a valid cause of action by the onc harmed against the
one who misled. Id. at 457-58. No contractual relationship needs to exist between them.
Id. at 451. Tellingly, however, the interplay between fraud and contract law continued for
at least another 120 years. See I THOMAS ATKINS STREET, THE FOUNDATIONS OF LEGAL
LIABILITY: A PRESENTATION OF THE THEORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE COMMON LAW
374 (1906). As recently as 1906, some authors still considered fraud to be a part of
contract law. See, e.g., id. For a brief overview of the Pasley case, see Cullen Goretzke,
The Resurgence of Caveat Emptor: Puffery Undermines the Pro-Consumer Trend in
Wisconsin's Misrepresentation Doctrine, 2003 WIS. L. REV. 171, 178 (2003).
68. Pasley, 100 Eng. Rep. at 451.
69. Id. at 457.
70. Id. at 450, 457-58.
71. 10 SPEISERET AL., supra note 64, § 32:3, at29.
72. The assumpsit action which subsumed breach of warranty was set forth in Stuart
v. Wilkins (1778) 99 Eng. Rep. 15, 15-16 (KB); see also 10 SPEISER ET AL., supra note 64,
§ 32:3, at 29.
73. 10 SPEISERET AL., supra note 64, § 32:3, at 29.
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an intent to mislead, whereas the contract action on a warranty
has no such requirements. '" 74
This fork in the law is important for understanding the
reliance element, and how it would apply to a climate change
fraud claim. Although the tort of fraud parted ways with
contract law two and a half centuries ago, the two actions, fraud
and warranty, trace their roots to the same place: one-on-one
transactions whereby one party misled another with regard to the
transaction, either as a party to the deal or a third party to it.
Fraud grew out of personal deceptions, beginning with Pasley.75
Interestingly, reliance was not discussed at all in Pasley.76 It
was, nevertheless, present because the plaintiff there relied on
the defendant's misrepresentation.77
Was reliance considered an element of fraud under the
Pasley decision? The answer is not clear. What is clear is that
American fraud actions throughout the nineteenth century,
during which fraud became established as a common law tort
action in all fifty states, centered almost exclusively on one-on-
one deceptions whereby Person A sought to deceive Person B to
Person B's detriment.78 In such claims, of course, the intent
element as well as the reliance element play clear key roles.
The reliance element is a product of the context in which
most early fraud cases were addressed: one-on-one deceptions
whereby the injured party relied on the misleading statement or
74. Mother Earth, Ltd. v. Strawberry Camel, Ltd., 390 N.E.2d 393, 400 (II. App. Ct.
1979); see also KEETON ET AL., supra note 63, § 105, at 685; Leon Green, Deceit, 16 VA.
L. REv. 749, 767 (1930).
75. Pasley, 100 Eng. Rep. at 450.
76. See generally Pasley, 100 Eng. Rep. 450.
77. Id. at 450.
78. See Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 48, at 1756, 1758 (noting that the law of
deceit "first developed in a world of face-to-face transactions," but "rejcct[ing] the notion
that deceit is a wrong that belongs to a bygone era of face-to-face transactions"); 10A
HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL & SAMUEL WOLFF, INT'L CAP. MARKETS & SEC. REG. §
15:16 (2019) ("The common law of deceit grew out of face-to-face transactions in which
information is furnished by one party to the other."); Elizabeth Chamblee Burch,
Reassessing Damages in Securities Fraud Class Actions, 66 MD. L. REv. 348, 349 (2007)
(noting that "the modem-day fraud-on-the-market securities class action bears little factual
resemblance to its common law predecessors, deceit and misrepresentation, which
provided conventional contract-based remedies for fraud in face-to-face dealings"). It
should be noted that there is no data available on precisely what percentage of the total
fraud cases in the past two centuries were personal deceptions as opposed to deceptions on
the public, but my review of more than 300 cases revealed almost all of them to involve
personal deception.
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omission of the defendant.79  Today, reliance is nearly
universally required,8 ° though some exceptions have been
carved out.
8 1
2. How Reliance Applies in Fraud Claims Involving
Commercial Public Deception Schemes
When it comes to commercial public deception schemes,
the reliance element works counter to the purpose and spirit of
deceit. Generally speaking, reliance plays dual roles within the
tort of fraud that are often misunderstood. On one hand, the
element stands in for actual and proximate causation, at least to
some extent.82  On the other hand, reliance also plays an
important part in establishing the requisite tort duty in fraud
cases. 83 Again, these are the roles the element fulfills in one-on-
one deceptions.
The fact that several courts today list the fraud elements
without including causation, 84 however, has caused some to
question whether reliance is just a causation element by another
name. 85 To establish actual cause, tort plaintiffs must generally
show a cause-effect relationship between the defendant's
wrongful conduct and the injury suffered.86 The reliance
requirement arguably forces plaintiffs to make this showing
because it ensures that the loss resulted from reasonable reliance
on the defendant's misleading statement or omission. 87 Reliance
79. See 10A BLOOMENTHAL & WOLFF, supra note 78, § 15:16; see also Bailey v.
Glover, 88 U.S. 342, 343-44 (1874).
80. 10 SPEISERET AL., supra note 64, § 32:18, at 7-9.
81. See, e.g., Kaufman v. i-Stat Corp., 754 A.2d 1188, 1195 (N.J. 2000).
82. See In re King, 68 B.R. 569, 572 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1986) ("Civil fraud and
actionable civil fraud are not the same. Actionable civil fraud requires a nexus between the
act or omission and the alleged loss to the defrauded party. That nexus is reliance. Civil
fraud without reliance is merely descriptive of conduct, is 'fraud in the air', and is not
actionable.").
83. See Goldberg etal., supra note 62, at 1013.
84. See, e.g., Elworthy v. First Tennessee Bank, 391 P.3d 1113, 1124 (Wyo. 2017);
Cornelison v. TIG Ins., 376 P.3d 1255, 1270 (Alaska 2016) (citing Shetata v. Salvation
Army, 225 P.3d 1106, 1114 (Alaska 2010)).
85. Merritt B. Fox, Demystifying Causation in Fraud-on-the-Market Actions, 60
BUS. LAW. 507, 507-08 (2005).
86. City of St. Louis v. Benjamin Moore & Co., 226 S.W.3d 110, 113-14 (Mo.
2007).
87. See Fox, supra note 85, at 507-08.
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is also sometimes considered to function as an excessive-
liability filter that proximate cause provides in negligence
actions.
However, in exploring the role of reliance in fraud, John
C.P. Goldberg and his coauthors noted that "the requirement of
reliance is linked to a more general feature of tort law, namely,
the relational structure of tort duties." 89 "To commit a tort,"
Professor Goldberg goes on to state, "is to breach a duty that is
owed by an actor to a class of potential victims. Thus to prevail,
a tort plaintiff must establish not merely that wrongful conduct
has resulted in harm to her, but that conduct wrongful as to a
person in her position has harmed her."90  According to
Professor Goldberg, then, a fraud plaintiff's reliance-at least in
a one-on-one fraud claim- "is essential to establishing that the
defendant's conduct was wrongful as to her." 91  This
interpretation of the reliance element identifies it as a central
keystone necessary to hold the rest of the edifice up. 92 Without
reliance, there is no fraud.93
Placed in its proper historical context, Goldberg's
conclusion makes perfect sense. In a one-on-one deception, a
fraud claim must necessarily include reliance by the defendant
because it is that very reliance that completes the fraudulent act.
However, should this no-reliance-no-fraud principle apply
with equal force to those areas of common law fraud that have
been expanded to recognize forms of indirect 94 or implicit
reliance? 95 Professor Goldberg argues the answer is yes.96 Or
88. See In re Mounce, 390 B.R. 233, 247 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2008) (noting that
"Texas fraud jurisprudence requires proof of reliance to establish proximate cause of the
plaintiff's injury").
89. Goldberg et al., supra note 62, at 1003.
90. Id. (emphasis in original).
91. Id.
92. See id. at 1002-03.
93. Id.
94. "Indirect reliance allows a plaintiff to prove a fraud action when he or she heard
a statement not ,from the party that defrauded him or her but from that party's agent or from
someone to whom the party communicated the false statement with the intention that the
victim hear it, rely on it, and act to his or her detriment." Kaufman v. i-Stat Corp., 754
A.2d 1188, 1195 (N.J. 2000).
95. See generally Karen Sandrik, Overlooked Tool: Promissory Fraud in the Class
Action Context, 35 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 193 (2007) (examining "the theory of implicit
reliance in promissory fraud and argu[ing] that, if used in conjunction with the economic
tort strategy, it will enable courts to forego individualized determinations of reliance and
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rather, he and his coauthors argue the answer must be yes
because the issue in a fraud case "is whether the defendant has
actually succeeded in harming the plaintiff by virtue of
defrauding the plaintiff, as opposed to having harmed the
plaintiff by deceiving others."
97
While this general proposition holds true with regard to
private deceptions, the conclusion the authors draw from it is too
broad if applied to certain public deceptions, like the fossil fuel
industry's campaign of climate change misinformation aimed at
the public, policymakers, and courts rather than at any particular
individual. Any serious analysis of the role and purpose of
reliance in fraud must take into account the nature of the
deceptive practice to which the fraud law is being applied. One
important component of such analysis is whether the deceptive
practice was private or public, a distinction rarely discussed in
the case law or the literature.
"Private deception," which I sometimes refer to as one-on-
one deception, as these terms are used in this article, is where
Person A misleads Person B to Person B's detriment. Here,
Person B must reasonably rely on Person A's misleading
representation in order to recover. By contrast, "public
deception," as the term is used in this article, is where Person A
makes a misleading representation to a large number of people,
or even to the public at large, intending that someone, though
not necessarily any particular person, rely on it to Person A's
advantage, and someone does rely on it to Person A's advantage.
From here, there are different ways public deception can play
out. Among the myriad different public deception schemes,
climate change fraud is unique in several ways. To understand
just how it is different, it is worth summarizing some of the
common public deception schemes (securities, accounting, and
consumer fraud) to juxtapose them against climate change fraud.
Securities fraud. Securities fraud, also known as stock
fraud and investment fraud, is a deceptive practice in the stock
or commodities markets that induces investors to make purchase
or sale decisions on the basis of false information, frequently
damages").
96. See Goldberg et al., supra note 62, at 1003.
97. Id. at 1009 (emphasis in original).
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resulting in losses, in violation of securities laws.98 Investors
harmed by such violations can sue defendants for civil
damages. 99 There are also criminal statutes imposing penalties
for securities law violations.'00 One instructive example is the
lawsuits arising out of the Bre-X matter.10 1 There, a Canadian
mining company, Bre-X Minerals, Ltd., reported its Indonesian
gold property contained more than 200 million ounces of gold,
which would have made it the richest gold mine ever. 102 The
stock price for Bre-X skyrocketed to a high of $280 (split
adjusted), making millionaires out of many of its
shareholders. 0 3 At its peak, Bre-X had a market capitalization
of $4.4 billion. 10 4  When, in 1997, the public learned the gold
mine contained little to no viable gold deposits, stock tanked,
and fell to mere pennies.10 5 Investors lost nearly all, if not all,
money they'd invested in the company. 10 6  Bre-X was sued
civilly and charged criminally. 10 7  Its deceptive practices are
representative of securities fraud generally: a materially
misleading representation or omission is made to the public, i.e.,
the market, and one or more investors purchases or sells stock in,
reliance on that misrepresentation and, as a result, the investor
98. 2 JOEL M. ANDROPHY, WHITE COLLAR CRIME § 12:16, at 12-41 to -42 (2019);
How Can Investors Get Money Back in a Fraud Case Involving a Violation of the Federal
Securities Laws?, U.S. SEC. & ExCH. COMM'N: FAST ANSWERS, [https://perma.cc/4ZXZ-
5HSL] (last visited Oct. 23, 2019).
99. 15 U.S.C. § 78i(f) (2010).
100. 18 U.S.C. § 1348 (2009).
101. See, e.g., Ann Morales Olazdbal, Analyst and Broker-Dealer Liability Under
10(b) for Biased Stock Recommendations, I N.Y.U. J.L. & BuS. 1, 42-47 (2004);
McNamara v. Bre-X Minerals Ltd., 256 F. Supp. 2d 549, 551-53 (E.D. Tex. 2002); Carom
v. Bre-X Minerals Ltd. (1999), 43 O.R. 3d 441 (Can. Ont. Gen. Div.); Janet Walker,
Crossborder Class Actions: A View from Across the Border, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 755,
798 (2004).
102. McNamara v. Bre-X Minerals Ltd., 57 F. Supp. 2d 396, 402, 413 (E.D. Tex.
1999).
103. Lauren Snider, Corporate Economic Crimes, in CORPORATE AND WHITE-
COLLAR CRIME 39,45 (2008).
104. Will Kenton, Bre-X Minerals Ltd., INVESTOPEDIA, [https://perma.cc/RG8E-
WWLC] (last updated Apr. 28, 2018); Bre-X, WIKIMILI, [https://perma.cc/3UYS-4FPU]
(last updated Sept. 20, 2019).
105. Snider, supra note 103, at 45-46.
106. For instance, the Quebec Public Sector Pension fund lost $70 million, the
Ontario Teachers' Pension Plan lost $100 million, and the Ontario Municipal Employees'
Retirement Board lost $45 million. Id. at 46.
107. Id.
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loses money. 10 8 Reliance in such cases is generally presumed
because publicly available information is deemed to be
incorporated into the stock price under the fraud-on-the-market
doctrine.109 Accordingly, no first-party reliance is generally
required to be proved.1"0
Accounting fraud. "Accounting fraud is intentional
manipulation of financial statements to create a facade of a
company's financial health."'11  These fraudulent records are
often used to seek investment in the company's bond or stock
issues. 112  Showing these false entries, companies may also
attempt to submit fraudulent loan applications as a final attempt
to obtain money fraudulently.1" 3  Through accounting fraud, a
company can hide serious financial problems. 1 4  Accordingly,
accounting fraud is not its own distinct area of law; rather, it is
closely tied to securities fraud and is usually addressed under
that umbrella. 115  However, some accounting fraud schemes
have also been the subject of common law fraud claims." 
6
Consumer fraud. "Consumer fraud is commonly defined as
deceptive business practices that cause consumers to suffer
financial or other losses. ' 17  Similar to securities and
accounting fraud, consumer fraud involves schemes whereby
Person A makes misleading or false representations or omissions
108. McNamara v. Bre-X Minerals Ltd., 57 F. Supp. 2d 396, 403 (E.D. Tex. 1999).
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Steven Nickolas, What Is Accounting Fraud, INVESTOPEDIA,
[https://perma.cc/S3QB-UDU5] (last updated Nov. 19, 2018).
112. See Todd Tresidder, The Top 16 Types of Securities Fraud You Must Avoid,
FIN. MENTOR, [https://perma.cc/3RX9-D6BV] (last visited Oct. 23, 2019).
113. See id.
114. See James A. Kaplan, Why Corporate Fraud Is on the Rise, FORBES (June 10,
2010), [https://perma.cc/R6S8-MJV4].
115. See, e.g., Alaska Elec. Pension Fund v. Adecco S.A., 371 F. Supp. 2d 1203,
1212 (S.D. Cal. 2005) ("[T]o properly state a claim for accounting fraud, securities fraud
plaintiffs must plead facts sufficient to support a conclusion that defendant prepared the
fraudulent financial statements and that the alleged financial fraud was material."); Knox v.
Yingli Green Energy Holding Co. Ltd., 242 F. Supp. 3d 950, 971-74 (C.D. Cal. 2017)
(holding that investors failed to state a securities fraud claim based on accounting fraud)
(internal quotations omitted).
116. AUSA Life Ins. Co. v. Ernst & Young, 991 F. Supp. 234, 252 (S.D.N.Y. 1997),
rev 'd, 206 F.3d 202 (2d Cir. 2000).
117. What Is the Definition of Consumer Fraud?, WINSTON & STRAWN,
[https://perma.cc/2LQN-UZC7] (last visited Oct. 23, 2019).
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to the public rather than to any particular individual." 8  Thus,
consumer fraud is another species of public deception. Fraud
against consumers is "often related to false promises or
inaccurate claims made to consumers," failing to warn
customers of dangers posed by a product, or "practices that
directly cheat consumers out of their money."' 19 The fraud is
accomplished when a consumer or a third person is harmed by
the product or transaction. 120  There are federal and state
consumer protection laws that provide civil penalties for
consumer fraud. 121 Consumer fraud schemes have also been the
subject of claims under common law fraud and Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). 122  One
particularly relevant and instructive consumer deception claim
was the tobacco industry's deception of the public regarding the
addictiveness and harmfulness of smoking cigarettes. 123
There are important parallels between commercial public
deception 124 by the tobacco, opioid, sugar, and baby powder
industries, on the one hand, and the fossil fuel industry, on the
other. 125  Of the former group of public deceptions, the tobacco
118. Consumer Fraud, DEBT.ORG, [https://perma.cc/6EXQ-YH7T] (last visited Oct.
23,2019).
119. What Is the Definition of Consumer Fraud?, supra note 117.
120. Id.
121. One such law is the Federal Trade Commission Act. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58
(2006). It created the Federal Trade Commission. 15 U.S.C. § 41. The FTC's Bureau of
Consumer Protection fights fraudulent business practices. 15 U.S.C. § 45. It collects
complaints, conducts investigations, and sues companies that have broken the law. 15
U.S.C. § 46. Federal laws have also been passed to protect the public in specialized areas,
such as against deceptive real estate transactions. 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58; see also 815 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 505/1 to /12 (1973); MINN. STAT. §§ 325F.68-.695 (2005).
122. In re Chrysler-Dodge-Jeep Ecodiesel Mktg., Sales Practices & Prods. Liab.
Litig., 295 F. Supp. 3d 927, 957 (N.D. Cal. 2018).
123. See infra note 135 and accompanying text.
124. "Commercial public deception," as the term is used in this article, refers to any
public deception scheme carried out with the aim of covering up or misleading the public
about dangers posed by a product, with the end goal, in whole or in part, of making profit
off of selling the product to the public.
125. See, e.g., Dubats, supra note 17, at 512 ("From the bench, climate change fraud
looks a lot like a tobacco fraud case, and decades of tobacco litigation may hold some
strategic insight for approaching a fraud case with comparably complex causal chains.
Tobacco plaintiffs struggled for many years to obtain tort compensation for wrongful
deaths and other injuries caused by smoking-related disease."); Angela Lipanovich, Smoke
Before Oil: Modeling a Suit Against the Auto and Oil Industry on the Tobacco Tort
Litigation Is Feasible, 35 GOLOEN GATE U. L. REV. 429, 431-32 (2005) (examining tobacco
litigation as a model for litigation addressing environmental harms caused by vehicle and
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industry's public deception is both the most well-known 126 and
the most extensively litigated. 127  It therefore serves as a
particularly well-suited representative example of the way in
which this kind of public deception is carried out. 
128
Tobacco manufacturers misled the public for decades.
They did this by, among other things, claiming tobacco was not
addictive and insisting the health problems it allegedly caused
(including death from cancer, heart disease, and other terminal
conditions) were instead caused by other environmental and
genetic factors that had nothing to do with smoking.' 29  This
misinformation campaign was both incredibly successful and
incredibly destructive. It made the tobacco industry billions in
profits over the course of several decades and resulted in the
deaths of millions of people. 130  Today, tobacco still kills seven
million people per year worldwide. 
131
Smokers and their surviving relatives began suing the
tobacco companies under many theories, including fraud, in the
1950s. 132  Almost every one of them lost. 133  The tobacco
power generation emissions respect to issues of standing, preemption, and products
liability).
126. See Robert E. Wagner, Mortal Democracy: When Corporations Bribe, 13
N.Y.U. J. L. & BUS. 193, 226 (2016) ("A well-known example of wrongdoing intimately
tied to the character and culture of the corporations involved was the tobacco companies'
longstanding pattern of fraudulently misleading regulators and the public about the health
risks related to smoking."); see generally Peter Pringle, The Chronicles of Tobacco: An
Account of the Forces That Brought the Tobacco Industry to the Negotiating Table, 25
WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 387 (1999).
127. See Henderson & Twerski, supra note 6, at 70 (providing an overview of the
history of tobacco litigation); see generally Robert L. Rabin, A Sociolegal History of the
Tobacco Tort Litigation, 44 STAN. L. REV. 853 (1992) (providing further overview).
128. Another reason the tobacco industry's commercial public deception is a well-
suited representative example is because of the striking parallels between it and the
campaign of climate change doubt carried out by the fossil fuel industry. See, e.g., Dubats,
supra note 17, at 512, 518; Lipanovich, supra note 125, at 431-32.
129. See David Heath, Contesting the Science of Smoking, ATLANTIC (May 4, 2016),
[https://perma.cc/9FEB-CQ9Z].
130. See Health Consequences of Smoking, Surgeon General Fact Sheet, U.S. DEP'T
HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. (Jan. 16, 2014), [https://perma.ec/C4JC-GHGN]; Jennifer
Maloney & Saabira Chaudhuri, Against All Odds, the U.S. Tobacco Industry Is Rolling in
Money, WALL ST. J. (April 23, 2017), [https://perma.cc/QX82-WUUE].
131. Tobacco, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (July 26, 2019), [https://perma.cc/D2RZ-
6CWR].
132. Kathleen Michon, Tobacco Litigation: History & Recent Developments, NOLO,
[https://perma.cc/6WEF-56UM] (last visited Oct. 19, 2019).
133. Id.
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industry famously paid not a single penny in damages or
settlement to any tobacco liability case from 1954 to 1996.134
Leaving aside other claims like products liability, negligence,
and battery, the fraud claims against the tobacco industry were
no more successful than any other theory during six decades that
comprised phase one and phase two of the tobacco litigation
story. Why did this happen and how does reliance fit into the
picture?
To begin with, fraud plaintiffs suing tobacco companies
faced a gauntlet of hurdles, only one of which was reliance.
Plaintiffs' cases were ruled against, dismissed, and settled based
on Big Tobacco defenses such as lack of scientific proof that
cigarette smoking causes cancer, lack of evidence tobacco is
addictive, a redirection of the public's attention to other risk
factors, and consumers' assumption of the risk.135  Reliance,
however, was always a high burden for these plaintiffs, and
cases have been dismissed based on lack of reliance.136 Courts
have rarely even reached the question of whether the reliance
element was met in such cases, dismissing the cases instead by
ruling the reliance element could not be met. 137  It's true
smokers saw ads, marketing, and promotional materials, and
could therefore argue they relied on those, and that that reliance
caused their damages. But such commercial speech is given far
greater leeway in framing and describing a product, including
exaggerated claims and puffery, 138 than would noncommercial
kinds of representations. Once warning labels were required to
be affixed to tobacco products, beginning in 1965, this threw yet
134. Richard A. Draynard et al., Tobacco Litigation Worldwide, 320 BMJ 111, 111
(2000).
135. Sharon Milberger et al., Tobacco Manufacturers' Defence Against Plaintiffs'
Claims of Cancer Causation: Throwing Mud at the Wall and Hoping Some of It Will Stick,
15 TOBACCO CONTROL iv17, ivl9-20 (Supp. 2006).
136. Glassner v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 223 F.3d 343, 353 (6th Cir. 2000);
Valle-Ortiz v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 385 F. Supp. 2d 126, 133 (D.P.R. 2005).
137. Tompkin v. Am. Brands, Inc., 10 F. Supp. 2d 895, 906, 909-10 (N.D. Ohio
1998), affd in part, rev'd in part sub nom. Tompkin v. Am. Brands, 219 F.3d 566 (6th Cir.
2000).
138. See In re Cable & Wireless, PLC, 332 F. Supp. 2d 896, 900-01 (E.D. Va. 2004)
(holding that a corporation's "soft" statements concerning its financial condition and
prospects were mere puffery and therefore not actionable as securities fraud).
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another wrench into plaintiffs' attempt to hold the tobacco
manufacturers and their allies liable for fraud. 
139
At the same time, there is the complicating factor that the
key deception by Big Tobacco was not necessarily the deception
of the public at large, but the deception of government
regulators and Congress, which resulted in tobacco continuing to
be sold to the public unregulated and, for decades, without even
warning labels. 140  Not surprisingly, members of the public
actually harmed by tobacco industry deceptions were, for
decades, effectively barred from suing in fraud based on these
deceptions because plaintiffs in such cases could not satisfy the
reliance element. 
141
Only very recently, after the landmark RICO case against
the tobacco industry, United States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc.,
14 2
have courts begun to countenance fraud claims by those harmed
or killed by cigarettes against the tobacco companies whose
deceptions caused the plaintiffs' harm. 143  In Philip Morris, the
court held that the defendants "knowingly and intentionally
engaged in a scheme to defraud smokers and potential smokers,
for purposes of financial gain, by making false and fraudulent
statements, representations, and promises." 144  The tobacco
industry defendants were convicted of conspiring to perpetrate a
139. 2000 Surgeon General's Report Highlights: Warning Labels, CTR. DISEASE
CONTROL & PREVENTION, [https://perma.cc/WQB2-NU6B] (last visited Oct. 19, 2019).
140. See Richard C. Ausness, Cigarette Company Liability: Preemption, Public
Policy, and Alternative Compensation Systems, 39 SYRACUSE L. REV. 897, 954 (1988)
(noting that, prior to 1965, when warning labels were first required to be placed on tobacco
products, the tobacco companies knew the risks of smoking but represented to the public
that smoking was safe); Philip J. Hilts, Tobacco Company Was Silent on Hazards, N.Y.
TIMES (May 7, 1994), [https://perma.cc/EJC4-H6TM] (discussing internal tobacco
company documents that had come to light showing that tobacco industry executives chose
to remain silent and keep their research results secret).
141. See Sarah Roshanne Anchors, Mass Market Fraud Theory: Dispensing with
Individual Reliance in Class Actions Where Plaintiffs Allege Pervasive Misrepresentations
to the Public, 43 TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 221, 225 (2008).
142. United States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 787 F. Supp. 2d 68, 71 (D.D.C.
2011), aff'd, 686 F.3d 832 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
143. See, e.g., McLaughlin v. Am. Tobacco Co., 522 F.3d 215, 219 (2d Cir. 2008);
Engle v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 945 So. 2d 1246, 1254 (Fla. 2006); R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.
v. Whitmire, 260 So. 3d 536, 537 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2018); Frankson v. Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Corp., 67 A.D.3d 213, 215 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009).
144. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 787 F. Supp. 2d at 71 (quoting United States v. Phillip




fraud on the public.' 45 As an eventual result of that decision,
courts began to allow fraud claims to proceed against tobacco
industry defendants. 146 Some have even succeeded. 147
Thus, although plaintiffs in fraud cases against the tobacco
industry have enjoyed some recent successes, these came only
after decades of failure. The reliance element was one of the
major impediments to such claims. The public nature of the
deception made it nearly impossible for harmed plaintiffs to
seek redress in tort, generally, and under fraud, specifically.
The nature of the public deceptions carried out by the
opioid, sugar, and baby powder industries fall into this same
general category of fraud. In each case, a company sells a
product that poses a nonapparent danger to consumers and to
others, and it is most typically the consumer's reliance on the
seller's misrepresentations that misleads him or her into
purchasing the dangerous product and thereby causing the harm.
As difficult as it is to satisfy the reliance element in such
public deception fraud cases, the challenge is far greater in cases
of climate change fraud. Although the nature of the deception-
from the perspective of the fossil fuel industry is very similar to
the nature of the deception from the perspective of the tobacco
industry-in each case, the campaign of misinformation
playbook was nearly identical-the reliance component from the
perspective of the harmed plaintiff is very different. The
reliance bridge is far more difficult to cross in climate change
fraud cases.
C. How Climate Change Deception Differs from Other
Kinds of Commercial Public Deception
Sa-il Luciano Lliuya, a Peruvian farmer, does not smoke
cigarettes. Nor is he addicted to opiate painkillers. He does not
145. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 449 F. Supp. 2d 1, affid in part, vacated in part, and
remanded, 566 F.3d 1095 (D.C. Cir. 2009), and order clarified, 778 F. Supp. 2d 8 (D.D.C.
2011); Myron Levin, Big Tobacco Is Guilty of Conspiracy, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 18, 2006),
[https://perma.cc/M7F4-J3GL].
146. See High Court Ruling Paves Way for Fraud Suit over Light Cigarettes, 25
ANDREWS TOBACCO INDUS. LITIG. REP. 3, at 1 (2009).
147. See R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Mathis, 233 So. 3d 1224, 1224 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2017); Meghan Gourley, Jury Hits R.J. Reynolds for $5M in Widow's Suit over Fatal
Cancer, COURTROOM VIEW NETWORK (Aug. 16, 2016), [https://perma.cc/M4H3-XF9L].
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binge on American fast food or soft drinks, and he has
apparently never been exposed to cancer-causing asbestos. He
is, however, a victim of corporate deception, the result of which
is a daily threat to his life, his home, and the community he has
lived in his whole life. He is a victim of global warming. The
fossil fuel industry caused the now ever-present threat.
Safil lives in Huaraz, a town high in the Andes Mountains.
Huaraz made international news a few years ago because it was
at high risk of a glacial lake outburst flood, or GLOF, due to the
swelling of Lake Palcacocha, which lies a few miles up a narrow
valley from the town, to forty times its usual volume over the
past few decades. 148 Studies have concluded the swelling of the
lake is directly due to global warming. 149 A single GLOF,
which could be caused by just one piece of glacial ice calving
off and falling into the lake, could wipe out the homes of 50,000
people, including Sa-il's."o
The basic causal connection with CO2 emissions is simple.
The excess CO 2 emissions pumped into the atmosphere since the
industrial revolution has raised temperatures worldwide.
151
Those rising temperatures have shrunk the glaciers in Peru-a
country which contains seventy percent of the world's tropical
glaciers-to half their former size.' 5 2 They continue to shrink at
a shocking pace.' 53 The glacier above Lake Palcacocha poured
hundreds of thousands of cubic meters of meltwater into the
lake, swelling it to unprecedented levels.' 54  The threat of a
GLOF is real, 155 highly likely,' 56 and terrifying to those in the
flood path.
148. See Ciara Nugent, Climate Change Could Destroy This Peruvian Farmer's




151. The Causes of Climate Change, NASA, [https://perma.cc/63LZ-62A6] (last
visited Oct. 20, 2019).
152. Jeremy Hinsdale, Vanishing Glaciers: The Future of Water in Peru's High
Andes, EARTH INST., COLUM. UNIV. (June 12, 2018), [https://perma.cc/2YH6-44N7].
153. Id.
154. Ines Perez, Meltwater Catastrophes Are Forming High in the Andes, E&E
NEWS (Mar. 14, 2013), [https://perma.cc/XR64-PRC2].
155. Adam Emmer, Glacier Retreat and Glacial Lake Outburst Floods (GLOFs),
OxFORD REs. ENCYCLOPEDIA, NAT. HAZARD SCI. (Apr. 2017), [https://perma.cc/SBZ8-
MM5V]; Yvonne Schaub, Outburst Floods from High-Mountain Lakes: Risk Analysis of
Cascading Processes under Present and Future Conditions (2015) (unpublished
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Although sea-level rise and extreme weather events like
hurricanes, droughts, and wildfires have been the global
warming effects that have gotten the most attention, Sai'l's case
clearly shows that those harmed by global warming need not
live on the coast or in a desert. There are global warming
victims everywhere. Ironically, those who suffer the most from
global warming tend to be those least responsible for causing
it.15 7 The class of victims from global warming is growing and
will likely balloon in the coming decades. 158
Sauil sued the largest GHG emitter in Europe, German
energy firm RWE, to recover damages to compensate him and
his community for the harm caused by the threat from Lake
Palcacocha.' 59 The case is called Lliuya v. RWE AG. 160  In his
lawsuit, Sa'l alleged that RWE, which is responsible for 0.5%
of all CO 2 ever emitted by humans, 16 1 should pay for 0.5% of
the cost of making safe a glacial lake that has swollen to a
dangerous volume as a result of anthropogenic C02-induced
global warming. 162 Sal brought his claim under German Civil
Code Section 1004, a nuisance statute.1 63  Like American
nuisance law, Section 1004 prohibits using one's own property
in a way that impairs someone else's use of his or her
property. 164  Satil made no fraud claim. 165  Like innumerable
dissertation, University of Zurich) (on file with the Zurich University Library).
156. Amanda D. Cuellar & Daene C. McKinney, Climate Change Adaptation
Decision Making for Glacial Lake Outburst Floods from Palcacocha Lake in Peru, AM.
GEOPHYSICAL UNION (Dec. 2014), [https://perma.ccIU55P-T5D9].
157. Chris Mooney, The People Who 'll Be Hurt Most by Climate Swings Did the
Least to Cause Them, Study Says, WASH. POST (May 2, 2018), [https://perma.cc/GV54-
RA2X]; Climate Change: Small Island Developing States, CLIMATE CHANGE
SECRETARIAT, at 5 (2005), [https://perma.cc/TNE2-DS2X] ("Although small island
developing States are among the least responsible of all nations for climate change, they
are likely to suffer strongly from its adverse effects and could in some cases even become
uninhabitable.").
158. CLIMATE CHANGE 2014, supra note 12, at 67, 69 (2014).







The owner has especially two claims which result from his real right of
ownership: (i) the action of delivery of the res against the possessor, whereby
the possessor has not or no longer a right to possession vis-A-vis the owner
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other plaintiffs in climate change damages cases against GHG
emitters and fossil fuel companies, his only tort claim was in
nuisance. 166 The long record of plaintiffs choosing this path-or
being forced into it-demonstrates that fraud is not, or at least
not seen as, a viable option for such plaintiffs.
The point of discussing Satdl's story here is not to weigh in
on whether he could possibly prevail in any kind of fraud claim
against, say, ExxonMobil or against any other fossil fuel
company. Rather, it is to highlight that although individuals are
being damaged on account of deceptions by the fossil fuel
industry, there is no current U.S. law basis for pursuing tort
claims against those responsible for the deceptions because, in
part, the reliance element as applied in most fraud cases makes
the claim unwinnable. Yes, Sail can, and has, sued a major
GHG emitter for pumping CO 2 into the atmosphere, which no
doubt was a major cause of the global warming that put his town
at risk of a GLOF.
GHG emitters would never have been allowed to pump
C02 into the atmosphere without the fossil fuel industry's
campaign of climate change doubt, along with campaign
donations and political posturing. This convinced the United
States and international governments to continue allowing oil to
be extracted from the ground and burned as an energy source,
thereby releasing CO2.167  The fossil fuel industry's
misinformation and political action campaign was, and is, the
root cause of the global warming now threatening the entire
(Eigentumsherausgabeanspruch, rei vindicatio, § 985 BGB); and (ii) a claim
against interference with the enjoyment of the ownership right, whereby the
interference does not amount to a dispossession of the owner. This latter
claim against interference with ownership (Eigentumsst6rungsanspruch, actio
negatoria, § 1004 BGB), thus something which English lawyers would
associate with a kind of owner's remedy against nuisance or trespass, is
particularly important in respect of land, but also applies to moveables.
Andreas Rahmatian, A Comparison of German Moveable Property Law and English
Personal Property Law, GER. L. ARCHIVE, [https://perma.cc/K9V4-N3GM] (last visited
Oct. 16, 2019).
165. Decision, Landgericht Essen [LG] [District Court Essen] Dec. 15, 2016, 2 0
285/15 (Ger.), [https://perma.cc/SCU4-8RYE].
166. Id.
167. See Shannon Hall, Exxon Knew About Climate Change Almost 40 Years Ago,
SC. AM. (Oct. 26, 2015), [https://perma.cc/527S-UZNN] (reporting that Exxon's tactics




globe. Yet their misrepresentations and other deceptive
practices cannot fit the current definition of fraud because, in
part, those most harmed by them never relied directly on the
misrepresentations to their detriment. The actual causal
connection is clearly visible, and perhaps the proximate causal
connection as well. But reliance remains an absolute bar to such
claims.
This is where climate change fraud breaks off from other
similar commercial public deceptions whereby companies
mislead the public into purchasing destructive products. In other
major commercial public deceptions, like those by the tobacco,
sugar, opioid, and talcum powder industries, the ones primarily
harmed by the destructive product were those who purchased or
used the product, or those who interacted with purchasers or
users. 168  This provides a tenuous but tangible avenue for
plaintiffs to establish reliance in fraud cases against the
manufacturers of the product. That does not mean such claims
are likely to prevail, but they are at least possible.
Recent fraud claims against tobacco companies have
proven this to be true.' 6 9 It is possible, though by no means
easy, to establish reliance in such cases because the ones harmed
relied on the commercial public deceptions to purchase or use
the product, or otherwise come into contact with those who
did.17
0
Climate change damages, and the deceptions that cause
them, are quite different. Fossil fuel companies like
ExxonMobil misled the public for decades, but it was not the
public's or the consumers' reliance that mattered most, but
rather the reliance of political leaders, government regulators,
and courts, which allowed oil and other fossil fuels to avoid
government regulation and court liability. These
decisionmakers allowed the dangerous product to continue to be
168. See Christine P. Bump, Close but No Cigar: The WHO Framework Convention
on Tobacco Control's Futile Ban on Tobacco Advertising, 17 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 1251,
1254 (2003).
169. See Engle v. Liggett Group, Inc., 945 So. 2d 1246, 1255-56 (Fla. 2006)
(allowing individuals who smoked cigarettes and later suffered medical consequences as a
result to bring suit against tobacco companies who fraudulently presented products); Engle
v. RJ Reynolds Tobacco, No. 94-08273, 2000 WL 33534572, at *3 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 2000);




extracted from the ground, refined, sold, and burned for fuel,
releasing excess CO 2 and raising global temperatures. 17' The
ones harmed by these deceptions are not the congresspeople,
senators, agency regulators, judges, and justices that relied on
them to ExxonMobil's advantage, but those members of the
public who suffer harm from sea level rise, heatwaves, droughts,
wildfires, and other extreme weather events, as well as other
environmental threats like GLOFs. 72  People like Sa-61. As
many have observed, the ones who suffer most from global
warming are those who did least to cause it. 173
Of course, Sail's case represents just one possible climate
change fraud plaintiff. Other possible plaintiffs include coastal
communities whose homes, businesses, or infrastructures are
damaged or destroyed by sea level rise; 174 property owners
whose property is damaged by extreme weather events;'
75
individuals displaced by coastal flooding or erosion; 176 and
individuals whose occupations become less profitable or
unprofitable on account of increasing temperatures, sea level
rise, ocean acidification, and extreme weather events, like
farmers and fishing professionals. 
177
171. Oil: When We Drill, We Spill, GREENPEACE, [https://perma.cc/8NTP-9KSQ]
(last visited Oct. 21, 2019).
172. See, e.g., Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d 863,
868 (N.D. Cal. 2009); Decision, Landgericht Essen [LG] [District Court Essen] Dec. 15,
2016, 2 0 285/15 (Ger.), [https://perma.cc/SCU4-8RYE]; Leghari v. Fed'n of Pakistan,
(2015) W.P. No. 25501/2015 (Pak.); Dellinger, supra note 13, at 537-38.
173. See, e.g., Mooney, supra note 157; Martin Wolf, Why Climate Change Puts the
Poorest Most at Risk, FIN. TIMES (Oct. 17, 2017), [https://perma.cc/3VDJ-J3YP]; Suzanne
Goldenberg, Climate Change: The Poor Will Suffer Most, GUARDIAN (Mar. 30, 2014),
[https://perma.cc/7EUX-XREP].
174. CLIMATE CHANGE 2014, supra note 12, at 65.
175. Virginia Murray et al., Case Studies, in MANAGING THE RISKS OF EXTREME
EVENTS & DISASTERS TO ADVANCE CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION 487, 489, 523-24
(2012).
176. Warren Cornwall, As Sea Levels Rise, Bangladeshi Islanders Must Decide
Between Keeping the Water Out--or Letting It In, So. MAG. (Mar. 1, 2018),
[https://perma.cc/WD2C-N2HD] (e.g., Bangaladesh will likely cause huge humanitarian
crisis because millions of people live at or near sea level, and there are few places for




D. Imposing the Traditional Intent and Reliance
Requirements in Climate Change Fraud Cases Frustrates
Justice
"The law of fraud is pervasive."'178 What does this mean?
It means the laws prohibiting and punishing fraudulent behavior
are not in any one spot. Misrepresentation is not confined to a
single category of actions walled off from other torts like, say,
assault or false imprisonment. Rather, "[m]isrepresentation runs
all through the law of torts as a method of accomplishing
various types of tortious conduct which, for reasons of historical
development or as a matter of convenience, usually are grouped
under categories of their own."
' 79
A number of different torts can be, and often are,
accomplished through misrepresentation. For instance, "a
battery may be committed by feeding the plaintiff poisoned
chocolates or inducing his consent to a physical contact by
misrepresenting its character."' 180  Likewise, "[f]alse
imprisonment may result from a pretense of authority to make
an arrest, a trespass to land from fraudulent statements inducing
another to enter, or a conversion from obtaining possession of
goods by fraudulent representations."' 18 1
While fraud law may be pervasive, it is far from perfect.
Numerous fraudulent schemes slip easily through the loopholes
in the current fraud law. 182 One of them is climate change fraud.
What is climate change fraud? One clear example is
ExxonMobil, and its predecessor, Exxon, purposefully spreading
false representations that global warming is not happening, that
it is not caused primarily by burning fossil fuels, and that
curbing or capping fossil fuel use would not greatly reduce the
effects of global warming in the coming decades. 183  This
campaign of climate change doubt included, as well, hiding the
178. PETER A. ALCES, LAW OF FRAUDULENT TRANSACTIONS § 2:1 (2019).




182. David B. Spence & Robert Prentice, The Transformation of American Energy
Markets and the Problem of Market Power, 53 B.C. L. REv. 131, 201 (2012).
183. Amy Lieberman & Susanne Rust, Big Oil Braced for Global Warming While It
Fought Regulations, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 31, 2015), [https://perma.cc/2GDS-8Y8Y].
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scientific truths the company knew regarding these topics from
the public. 184  This commercial public deception was done
purposefully and with absolute disregard to the dire
consequences that it would have on millions, if not billions, of
people.
The size, scope, and effect of this commercial public
deception can be compared only to the leaded gasoline
industry's deception of the public resulting in global lead
poisoning, which persists to today, and the tobacco industry's
deception that has killed more than twenty million Americans
since 1964.185 That is, the fossil fuel industry's deception is on
par with the largest and most destructive commercial public
deception campaigns in history.
Today, we are just beginning to get a glimpse of the actual
effects it is having on our climate and people. These effects,
including sea level rise and extreme weather events, were
predicted in the 1970s and 1980s by none other than Exxon's
own scientists. 1 6  Global warming's existence, causes, and
likely effects were well known then. 187  They were nearly
universally acknowledged by the climate science community by
the late 1980s. 188 Yet all throughout the nineties and early
2000s, Exxon and ExxonMobil actively misled the public to its
detriment.
The fraud laws to date, however, provide no avenue
whatsoever for those harmed by global warming to sue
ExxonMobil or other fossil fuel companies for the deception that
caused their damages. Again, fraud grew out of the one-on-one
deception context, going back to Pasley. This is undoubtedly
one of the reasons it is tailored in a way that makes it unduly
difficult for those harmed by public deception to sue in fraud.
While those harmed by smoking cigarettes also face this
184. See Hall, supra note 167.
185. See Lawrence M. Ward, Lead Poisoning: Environmental Epidemic, 24 MD. B.
J. 14, 15 (1991); see generally U.S. DEP'T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., THE HEALTH
CONSEQUENCES OF SMOKING-50 YEARS OF PROGRESS: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON
GENERAL (2014).
186. See Hall, supra note 167; Benjamin Franta, Shell and Exxon's Secret 1980s
Climate Change Warnings, GUARDIAN (Sept. 19, 2018), [https://perma.cc/G5J8-BZBW].
187. See Hall, supra note 167.
188. See Lisa Song et al., Exxon Confirmed Global Warming Consensus in 1982




difficult fraud hurdle, those harmed by climate change fraud
face not a hurdle but an impenetrable wall: the reliance element.
A plaintiff harmed by global warming, whether because her
seaside home is flooded or because her crops have been
destroyed by higher temperatures and drier air, has no recourse
in fraud because she cannot establish that her damages arose out
of her reliance on the false statement or omission. This is why
Saiil Luciano Lliuya cannot sue ExxonMobil for fraud.
The result? On one hand, those harmed by global
warming-which, again, were those who least contributed to
causing it---cannot be compensated for the deceptive messages
and actions taken by the fossil fuel industry that caused the
global warming in the first place. On the other hand, those fossil
fuel companies not only evade liability and regulation, which
was the purpose of their deceptive messages and actions in the
first place, but they are indeed rewarded for the deceptions.
Their misrepresentations paid off and continue to pay off. They
reap billions in profits as a direct result of the false statements
and omissions they made to mislead the public on global
warming.
Those who acted in a wrongful manner by deceiving the
public are rewarded and those who did nothing wrong are
punished by being barred from even seeking legal redress
against those whose misrepresentations caused their harm.
m. HOW TRANSFERRED INTENT ADDRESSES A
SHORTCOMING IN TORT LAW SIMILAR TO THAT
NOW POSED BY CLIMATE CHANGE FRAUD
A. Origin of Transferred Intent
When deciding the case of Scott v. Shepherd 89 two and a
half centuries ago, judges on the King's Bench in England faced
a conundrum. The facts of the case were clear. How the law
should be applied was not. A boy, Shepherd, had tossed a
lighted firecracker into a market and it landed on a vendor's
stand near Willis, a customer. 190 Willis quickly picked up the
firecracker and threw it across the market where it landed next
189. Scott v. Shepherd (1773) 96 Eng. Rep. 525 (KB).
190. Id. at 525-26.
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to one of the vendors, Ryal.' 91 Ryal picked it up and threw it
once again. 192 The firecracker exploded just as it hit a nearby
bystander in the face.' 93 That bystander, Scott, lost an eye in the
explosion.' 94 He sued Shepherd for damages.'
95
The conundrum was this: Scott sued Shepherd in trespass, a
tort action for injuries caused by the defendant's direct force to
the plaintiff, yet Shepherd, although he had certainly caused the
resulting injury, had not directed any force at Scott. 19 6 In fact,
Shepherd had not directed force at any particular person at all,
instead simply-and mischievously-throwing the lit
firecracker into a crowded market. 197 Moreover, Willis's and
Ryal's independent intervening acts of throwing the firecracker
made the resulting injury to Scott even less the result of any
direct force by Shepherd. 198 Under the law of trespass at the
time, Scott had no valid claim against Shepherd, at least not in
trespass. 199
The judges, however, did not follow the law. They instead
found the throws by Willis and Ryal, although volitionally
moving the firecracker ultimately to Scott's face, were not
voluntary acts but reflexive reactions done without purpose or
intent.2 0 0  The court found that all liability for Scott's injury
rested with the original thrower, Shepherd.20 ' From that case
forward, defendants that applied such indirect force could be
liable.20 2 This expansion of the law to allow trespass actions for
the application of indirect force became, under later trespassory
tort cases in both England20 3 and the United States, 20 4 the
doctrine of transferred intent.
20 5
191. Id. at 526.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Scott, 96 Eng. Rep. at 526.
195. Id. at 525.
196. See id. at 525-26.
197. See id.
198. See id. at 526.
199. Scott, 96 Eng. Rep. at 526-27.
200. See id. at 528.
201. See id. at 528-29.
202. See id. at 529.
203. See James v. Campbell (1832) 172 Eng. Rep. 1015, 1015 (KB); see also
William L. Prosser, Transferred Intent, 45 TEx. L. RFv. 650, 654 (1967).
204. See, e.g., Lopez v. Surehia, 246 P.2d 111, 113 (Cal. Ct. App. 1952); Smith v.
Moran, 193 N.E.2d 466, 468 (111. App. Ct. 1963); Tuttle v. Forsberg, 73 N.E.2d 861, 863-
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B. Applying Transferred Intent
To be liable for an intentional tort, the defendant must have
acted with intent to cause a certain kind of result.2 °6 This
usually means the defendant acted with the purpose or object of
causing the result.20 7 This includes, for example, pulling a chair
out from someone about to sit down for the purpose of making
them fall down, or throwing a rock at a neighbor's dog with the
intention of hitting and hurting it. However, a defendant can
also be considered to act with the requisite intent if the
defendant knows to a substantial certainty that his act will result
in the harm done.20 8 This includes, for instance, pulling a chair
out from under someone about to sit down or throwing a rock at
a neighbor's dog without wanting or meaning to harm the person
or the dog, but knowing to a substantial certainty the resulting
harm could occur.
Accordingly, "intentional tort liability requires that the
defendant have intended the type of interference with the
plaintiffs legally protected interests that is the basis of the
plaintiff's claim. ' '2 9  Liability for assault requires that the
defendant have acted with an intent to cause a reasonable
64 (111. App. Ct. 1947); Anderson v. Arnold, 79 Ky. 370, 373 (1881); Murphy v. Wilson,
44 Mo. 313, 318 (1869); Morrow v. Flores, 225 S.W.2d 621, 624 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949);
Carnes v. Thompson, 48 S.W.2d 903, 904 (Mo. 1932); Davis v. Collins, 48 S.E. 469, 471
(S.C. 1904); Bannister v. Mitchell, 104 S.E. 800, 801 (Va. 1920); Singer v. Marx, 301 P.2d
440, 443 (Cal. Ct. App. 1956); Peterson v. Haffher, 59 Ind. 130, 133 (1877); Talmage v.
Smith, 59 N.W. 656, 657 (Mich. 1894); McKeon v. Manze, 157 N.Y.S. 623, 625 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1916); Keel v. Hainline, 331 P.2d 397, 399 (Okla. 1958).
205. Prosser, supra note 203, at 654.
206. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS §§ 102, 105 (AM. LAW INST., Tentative
Draft No. 1, 2015). However, under the old common law in place at the time of Scott v.
Shepherd, and up through the nineteenth century, it was considered "sufficient intent for
trespass liability" if a defendant merely "engaged in an intentional act, such as throwing an
object or driving a vehicle." Peter B. Kutner, The Prosser Myth of Transferred Intent, 91
IND. L. J. 1105, 1107 (2016). "There was no requirement that the [defendant] act with an
intent to cause what happened to the plaintiff or any other specific consequence." Id.
207. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § I (AM. LAW INST. 2010); KEETON ET
AL., supra note 63, § 8, at 34.
208. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 1; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
8A (AM. LAW INST. 1965); DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 48 (2000).
209. Kutner, supra note 206, at 1107; see also KEETON ET AL., supra note 63, § 8, at
36; Jerome J. Atrens, Intentional Interference with the Person, in STUDIES IN CANADIAN
TORT LAW 378, 379 (Allen M. Linden ed., 1968); Anthony J. Sebok, Purpose, Belief and
Recklessness: Pruning the Restatement (Third)'s Definition of Intent, 54 WAND. L. REV.
1165, 1168-69 (2001).
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apprehension of imminent harmful or offensive contact to the
plaintiff's person. 210  Liability for battery, on the other hand,
requires that the defendant have acted with an intent to cause
harmful or offensive contact to the plaintiffs person.211
Liability for the other trespassory torts likewise requires that the
defendant have acted with the intent to bring about the resulting
harm that actually occurred.2 12
Transferred intent expands the scope of intentional tort
liability to encompass certain defendants that lack the requisite
intent to harm the victim that is actually harmed.213 It does this
in three primary ways. First, where a defendant intends to harm
Person A but instead harms Person B, the defendant is held
liable in intentional tort for the harm to Person B. 2 14 For
instance, if the defendant shoots a gun aiming at Person A, but
misses and hits Person B, then the defendant can be liable for a
battery for the harm to Person B.215  This is true even if the
defendant was unaware of Person B. As stated by one court,
"intent follows the bullet.,
216
The second primary way transferred intent expands liability
is where a defendant intends Tort A but actually carries out Tort
B. 2 17 Such a defendant is held liable for Tort B even though he
never intended to carry out Tort B. 2 18  For instance, where a
210. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS § 21.
211. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 13.
212. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 35,217, 158.
213. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 16.
214. DOBBS, supra note 208, at 75-77. For example, in In re White v. White, the
defendant shot at a third party, but the bullet hit the plaintiff, who was a bystander, instead.
In re White v. White, 18 B.R. 246, 249 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1982). Similarly, in Baska v.
Scherzer, the plaintiff was injured when trying to break up a fist fight between two high
school boys. Baska v. Scherzer, 156 P.3d 617, 626-27 (Kan. 2007). The Kansas Supreme
Court held that transferred intent applied, rendering the boys liable for battery. Id. ("Each
defendant intended to strike at the other in order to cause harm. ... The fact that the
punches in question hit the plaintiff rather than the defendants is immaterial to the
analysis.").
215. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 16 cmt. b, illus. 3.
216. Poe v. State, 652 A.2d 1164, 1168 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1995).
217. DOBBS, supra note 208, at 76.
218. See, e.g., Labadie v. Semler, 585 N.E.2d 862, 864 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990)
(holding that the defendant was liable for battery when he attempted to scare the plaintiff
by throwing a snowball at her, and the snowball hit the plaintiff in the face); Nelson v.
Carroll, 735 A.2d 1096, 1097 (Md. 1999) (holding that the defendant was liable for battery
when, although he attempted to strike plaintiff in the head with a loaded gun, the gun
accidentally fired and caused plaintiff injury).
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defendant throws a rock intending it to land several feet clear of
someone standing nearby, so as only to scare them, instead
accidently hits the person with the rock, the defendant in fact
only intended an assault but can be held liable for a battery.2 19
The third kind of transferred intent is where a defendant
intends only to offend, but harm results, or vice versa.220  For
instance, if the defendant kisses the plaintiff against the
plaintiffs will, intending no physical harm, but the plaintiff
suffers an allergic reaction to the defendant's touch, the
defendant is liable for the harm as well as for the intended
offense. 221  The same principle imposes liability "if the
defendant intends a harmful touching but succeeds only in
imposing an offensive one." 222
These three kinds of transferred intent can be mixed and
matched. 23 For instance, if a person throws a rock intending
only to scare Person A but in fact hits Person B, the rock
thrower intended an assault on Person A but can be held liable
for a battery to Person B.22 4
C. Policy Justifications for Transferred Intent
As one would expect with a doctrine that imposes
intentional tort liability for unintended acts, transferred intent
has detractors.225 cEven its opponents, however, recognize the
doctrine's well-established place in modem American tort
law. 226 The leading critics of the doctrine oppose its expansion,
but none call for its elimination. 227 Transferred intent, as every
219. RESTATEMENT (SECOND)OFTORTS § 20 cmt. a, illus. 2.
220. DOBBS, Supra note 208, at 75.
221. Id.; see also Bettel v. Yim (1978) 20 O.R. 2d 617 (Ont. Co. Ct.);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 16 cmt. a.
222. DOBBS, supra note 208, at 75; see also Bettel, 20 O.R. 2d 617; RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 18, 20.
223. DOBBS, Supra note 208, at 76.
224. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: INTENTIONAL TORTS TO PERSONS § 110
cmt. b, illus. 3 (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 1, 2015).
225. Kutner, supra note 206, at 1136; Vincent R. Johnson, Transferred Intent in
American Tort Law, 87 MARQ. L. REv. 903, 918 n.52 (2004); Osborne M. Reynolds, Jr.,
Transferred Intent: Should Its "Curious Survival" Continue?, 50 OKLA. L. REV. 529, 531-
32 (1997).
226. Kutner, supra note 206, at 1140; Johnson, supra note 225, at 908; Reynolds, Jr.,
supra note 225, at 529.
227. Kutner, supra note 206, at 1107; Johnson, supra note 225, at 908, 918 n.52;
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torts professor knows, is widely applicable today in most, if not
all, American jurisdictions.
Few, however, have seriously probed the question of why.
Why did the judges in Scott v. Shepherd and other early English
cases expand trespass to include indirect application of force?
Why was that doctrine imported to America and applied to
intentional tort cases in U.S. courts? Why do American courts
continue to apply the transferred intent doctrine notwithstanding
decades of attacks lobbied at it by scholars and jurists? And
why is this doctrine worth all the trouble it stirs up?
In short, transferred intent's benefits far outweigh its
drawbacks. Yes, it is less than ideal to hold a wrongdoer liable
in intentional tort for a thing he did not intend to do. But, given
the two alternatives of either holding him liable or letting him
off the hook, the former is preferable to the latter for at least five
reasons. Each of these five is a policy justification underpinning
the doctrine's proliferation and application.
228
First, it is fairer to make the intentional wrongdoer
shoulder the loss than it is to make the innocent victim bear it.
229
Remember, for transferred intent to apply, the wrongdoer must
have intended some intentional tort to someone, just not
necessarily the particular tort that resulted or to the particular
victim harmed.2 3° One held liable under transferred intent, then,
is not free from blame. 231  According to Prosser, "[a]s between
the innocent plaintiff struck by the bullet and the guilty
defendant who fired it with intent to kill another man,
[transferred intent] put the loss upon the one upon whom it
ought in obvious justice to fall.",
232
Second, the expansion of liability permitted by the doctrine
"is broadly consistent with the policy of holding intentional
tortfeasors responsible for a wider range of consequences than
Reynolds, Jr., supra note 225, at 531-32.
228. See Reynolds, Jr., supra note 225, at 531 ("In the United States, the [transferred
intent] rule has been justified, not so much on the basis of the shaky English precedents, as
on the basis of policy.").
229. See Prosser, supra note 203, at 661; Johnson, supra note 225, at 911-12, 918.
230. See Kutner, supra note 206, at 1106.
231. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Pierson, 64 N.E. 484, 485 (Ind. App. 1902) (applying the
transferred intent doctrine and holding, "Plaintiff was injured through no fault of his own.
His right to be secure in person was violated. The appellant was responsible therefor. His
act was the primary cause of the plaintiffs injury.").
232. See Prosser, supra note 203, at 661.
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negligent tortfeasors." 233  This "can be justified either on the
basis of the possible violation of the criminal law involved or
simply on the antisocial and immoral nature of a defendant's
behavior., 234  Thus, where the defendant intended to hit one
person but struck another instead, liability to the unintended
victim can be justified on the basis of the "strong social policy"
of encouraging "obedience to the criminal law by imposing an
absolute civil liability to anyone who is physically injured as a
result of an intentional harmful contact or a threat thereof
directed either at him or a third person., 235  Under this policy,
intentional wrongdoers are not considered allowed to invoke the
defense that the harm they caused was a mere unintended
accident.236  In other words, although actual causation is
basically the same in intentional tort and negligence cases,
courts, as a matter of policy, refuse to impose proximate
causation requirements in intentional tort cases as is done in
negligence, greatly expanding the scope of liability in
intentional tort cases.2 3 7 In short, there is a "general principle of
intentional torts that there is liability for all the direct and natural
consequences of the defendant's act., 238
Why? Because one who commits an intentional tort is
considered morally blameworthy and is, accordingly, held to a
higher degree of accountability than is one whose conduct
unintentionally causes harm.2 39  This idea is encapsulated in a
233. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: INTENTIONAL TORTS TO PERSONS § 110
cmt. c (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 1, 2015); see also Reynolds, Jr., supra note
225, at 531; Derosier v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 130 A. 145, 152-53 (N.H. 1925);
KEETON ET AL., supra note 63, § 8, at 37.
234. Reynolds, Jr., supra note 225, at 531 (citing Ralph S. Bauer, The Degree of
Moral Fault as Affecting Defendant's Liability, 81 U. PA. L. REv. 586, 588-89 (1933)); see
generally The Tie That Binds: Liability of Intentional Tort-Feasors for Extended
Consequences, 14 STAN. L. REv. 362 (1962) (suggesting a combination of a direct-result
test and a foreseeability test to determine the extent of liability for intentional torts)
[hereinafter The Tie That Binds].
235. See Manning v. Grimsley, 643 F.2d 20,22 (1st Cir. 1981); see also Reynolds,
Jr., supra note 225, at 531.
236. Reynolds, Jr., supra note 225, at 531; see also Bauer, supra note 234, at 588.
237. Reynolds, Jr., supra note 225, at 531; see also LEON GREEN, RATIONALE OF
PROXIMATE CAUSE 170-71 (1927).
238. Reynolds, Jr., supra note 225, at 535.
239. Bauer, supra note 234, at 596; see also RESTATEMENT (THtRD) OF TORTS:
INTENTIONAL TORTS TO PERSONS § 110 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 1,
2015) ("[E]mploying transferred intent to extend the scope of liability for intentional
tortfeasors is entirely appropriate given the greater culpability of those who act with
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century-old maxim that has, over the years, been quoted by
AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE, PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS, and
the U.S. Supreme Court: "For an intended injury the law is
astute to discover even very remote causation."
240
Third, expanding liability through transferred intent is
consistent with the deterrent tort principle.241 "The deterrence
principle recognizes that tort law is concerned not only with
fairly allocating past losses, but also with minimizing the costs
of future accidents." 242 According to this principle, "tort rules
should discourage persons from engaging in those forms of
conduct which pose an excessive risk of personal injury or
property damage. ' '243 The idea is that transferred intent liability
incentivizes good behavior by providing a civil punishment for
bad behavior in addition to any criminal penalties. 244 Of course,
punishment as deterrence is normally a criminal consideration,
rather than a civil one,245 and at least one author has questioned
whether this policy has any real world effect.246 Nevertheless,
this provides one more justification for transferred intent.
Fourth, expanding liability through transferred intent is in
line with the principle, applied most often in transferred intent
battery cases, that if an act violates a criminal law there should
also be civil liability for its consequences even if the defendant
lacked the specific intent to cause the harm that occurred.247 For
instance, where a young boy hurled a rock at a little girl and hit
another girl instead, the court based liability on the unlawfulness
malicious intent and the policy behind scope of liability to avoid imposing liability out of
proportion to the culpability of the defendant.").
240. Derosier v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 130 A. 145, 152 (N.H. 1925); 136
CATHERINE PALO, AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3d 175, § 16 (2013); KEETON ET AL., supra
note 63, § 43, at 293 n. 6.
241. VINCENT R. JOHNSON & ALAN GUNN, STUDIES IN AMERICAN TORT LAW 7 (2d
ed. 1999); Reynolds, Jr., supra note 225, at 531; see also The Tie That Binds, supra note
234, at 364-65 (citing Clarence Morris, Punitive Damages in Tort Cases, 44 HARV. L. REV.
1173, 1174 (1931)).
242. JOHNSON & GUNN, supra note 241, at 7.
243. Id.; see also Johnson, supra note 225, at 918 n. 52.
244. JOHNSON & GUNN, supra note 241, at 7; Reynolds, Jr., supra note 225, at 531;
Clarence Morris, Punitive Damages in Tort Cases, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1173, 1174 (1931).
245. See Reynolds, Jr., supra note 225, at 531.
246. Id. ("Do potential wrongdoers really stop to consider the scope of civil
liability?") (emphasis in original).
247. Id. at 534.
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of the defendant's conduct.248  Similarly, where the defendant
had fired a gun multiple times at a waitress in a crowded
restaurant and wounded both his intended victim and the
plaintiff, another waitress, the court came to the same result for
the same reason.249 Thus, the unlawfulness of conduct justifies
both criminal and civil liability under transferred intent.
Fifth, and finally, courts have stressed that where multiple
persons participated in the harm-producing conduct, all of the
participants should be held jointly and severally liable to those
injured, without regard to whether a particular defendant had
any intent to harm, or even cause contact with, a particular
plaintiff.250 Accordingly, where a number of persons were
engaging in combat with pistols when an innocent passerby was
wounded by a shot, the court found that all of those taking part
in the gunfight may be held liable to the passerby. 251 Likewise,
where a defendant merely aids, abets, or encourages the
commission of a tort, the defendant can be held culpable by
courts and liable for intentional torts through transferred
intent.252
These five policy justifications have fortified the
transferred intent doctrine against what otherwise would likely
be a barrage of attacks. Indeed, given the doctrine's direct
contradiction of the intent element, allowing it to be satisfied
248.
The true rule is that intent is the gist of the action only where the battery was
committed in the performance of an act not otherwise unlawful. If the cause
of action is an alleged battery committed in the performance of an unlawful
or wrongful act, the intent of the wrongdoer to injure is immaterial. In other
words, if the defendant did an illegal act which was likely to prove injurious
to another, he is answerable for the consequence which directly and naturally
resulted from the conduct, even though he did not intend to do the particular
injury which followed.
Singer v. Marx, 301 P.2d 440, 442-43 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1956) (quoting Lopez v.
Surchia, 246 P.2d 11, 114 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1952)).
249. Smith v. Moran, 193 N.E.2d 466, 468 (Il1. App. Ct. 1963) ("It seems
abundantly clear to us that if the act of the defendant in the instant case was unlawful,
Count I properly alleges, and the evidence establishes, a cause of action in the plaintiff.").
250. Reynolds, Jr., supra note 225, at 535.
251. Murphy v. Wilson, 44 Mo. 313, 315-16 (1869); see also Reynolds, Jr., supra
note 225, at 535.
252. Keel v. Hainline, 331 P.2d 397, 400-01 (Okla. 1958) (finding that all
defendants who aided, abetted, encouraged or instigated a blackboard eraser throwing
fight, including those who never threw an eraser, could be liable for assault and battery
where an eraser hit a bystander in the eye, rendering it blind).
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where in fact no specific intent lies, one would expect far more
pushback than one sees in the literature. Even the doctrine's
most vigorous advocate, Prosser, called it an "arrant, bare-faced
fiction., 253  Notably, the authors of the RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
took issue with this characterization, pointing out that the
doctrine is not only well-established but also "justified by valid
reasons of principle and policy."
254
Fiction or not, however, transferred intent fills an important
gap in the law that, were it to be removed, would allow
wrongdoers to evade liability for harm they cause others.
Although negligence could partially fill in any gap left open by
the removal of transferred intent, it would not be anywhere near
an adequate replacement. Take, for instance, Person A throws a
rock at Person B, intending to harm Person B, but the rock
misses and instead hits and harms a hidden innocent bystander,
Person C, who Person A did not see, was unaware of, and had
no way of knowing that any person other than Person B could be
present. Transferred intent imposes liability for the harm. But
what result under negligence? Negligence, of course, always
means a lack of reasonable care under the circumstances, 255 and
a lack of such care is often hard to establish under a wide range
of circumstances, including this one.
The scope of liability for negligence is far narrower than it
is for intentional torts.2 56 This is unsurprising since intentional
harmful acts are deemed more culpable and deserving of greater
253. Prosser, supra note 203, at 650.
254.
The transferred-intent doctrine is often denigrated as a legal "fiction." In one
sense this characterization is accurate: the doctrine treats the actor as
possessing an intent that, as a matter of fact, the actor does not (or need not)
have. But in another sense the characterization is false. Insofar as the
constructive intent that the doctrine permits is justified by valid reasons of
principle and policy, the negative connotation that flows from characterizing
it as a "fiction" is undeserved.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: INTENTIONAL TORTS TO PERSONS § I IOC (AM. LAW
INST., Tentative Draft No. 1, 2015). Of course, calling any legal doctrine a "fiction" is
redundant since all laws exist only on paper and in our minds-what Professor Yuval Noah
Harari calls "fictional webs." See YUVAL NOAH HARARI , HOMO DEUS 155-56 (2016)
(pointing out that nations, corporations, money, and other human-made concepts are mere
fictional stories).
255. Negligence, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (11 th ed. 2019).
256. See Derosier v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 130 A. 145, 152 (N.H. 1925);
Reynolds, Jr., supra note 225, at 535; see also GREEN, supra note 237, at 170.
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liability.257 This is an important nuance even in tort where the
underlying purpose is always to compensate the victim. There
is, no doubt, a difference between being harmed by someone's
intentionally tortious acts and by someone's unintentional lack
of care. Transferred intent recognizes this qualitative difference
between an intent to do bad and an innocent mistake.
That was why the doctrine was first employed in English
courts two and a half centuries ago.258 It closed a gap in the law,
ensuring that the loss that occurred is shouldered by the
wrongdoer whose intentional acts brought about the loss rather
than by the innocent victim who suffered the loss through no
fault of her own.
IV. LEVELING THE PLAYING FIELD IN CLIMATE
CHANGE FRAUD BY APPLYING TRANSFERRED
INTENT
In the case of Lliuya v. R WE AG, the appellate court found
that Safil Luciano Lliuya could, as a matter of law, prove the
causal connection between the defendant's CO2 emissions in
Germany and the global warming-caused GLOF threat his
community faces in the high Andes of Peru.259  This opening
took many by surprise, and caused a minor sensation,
particularly in the European260 and South American media, 261 as
257. Kenneth Simmons, A Restatement (Third) of Intentional Torts?, 48 ARIz. L.
REv. 1061, 1088 (2006).
258. Prosser, supra note 203, at 654.
259. Lliuya v. RWE AG, SABIN CTR. FOR CLIMATE CHANGE L., supra note 14. The
court in Lliuya, which reversed the trial court's dismissal of the case, based its decision in
part on a study that detailed which energy companies were responsible for all C02
emissions emitted since the mid-] 800s, at the dawn of the Industrial Revolution. Decision,
Landgericht Essen [LG] [District Court Essen] Dec. 15, 2016, 2 0 285/15 (Ger.),
[https://perma.cc/SCU4-8RYE]. The study concluded that RWE AG was responsible for
0.5% of all C02 emissions. Id. Sa6l's claim, then, sought for RWE to pay its pro-rata
share of the total amounts awardable (0.5%) on account of the global warming-caused
GLOF threat to his community. Lliuya v. RWE AG, SABIN CTR. FOR CLIMATE CHANGE L.,
supra note 14; New Report Shows Just 100 Companies are Source of Over 70% of
Emissions, CARBON DISCLOSURE PROJECT GLOBAL (July 10, 2017),
fhttps://perma.cc/K2AW-6ZCD].
260. See Agence France-Presse, German Court to Hear Peruvian Farmer's Climate
Case Against RWE, THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 30, 2017), rhttps://perma.cc/BK6C-FLMJ];
Kristin Kruthaup, Peru Farmer Wins Appeal in Climate Case Against German Energy
Giant, DEUTSCHE PRESSE-AGENTUR INT'L (Nov. 13, 2017), [https://perma.cc/XMo8-
6P60]; Roxana Baldrich & Christoph Bals, RWE Lawsuit: First Test Case in Europe to
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well as in the climate change law community. 62 The ruling's
reach went far beyond the parameters of Sail's case. It was
seen as having vast potential ramifications for numerous other
claims, filed and unfiled, against GHG emitters and fossil fuel
companies. 263  After all, if you can causally connect the harm
(e.g., a threat from GLOF caused by global warming) to the
cause (emissions of C02 from burning fossil fuels) then the nail
is in the coffin for those causing global warming, right?
Not so fast. To prevail on any legal theory, of course, the
plaintiff must prove all the elements of the claim. Safil, again, is
suing RWE AG in nuisance. 264  The court has not, as of this
writing, ruled on whether Sa-il's claim will prevail. 265 What is
clear, however, is that even if Sail were to prevail in nuisance
against RWE, a coal-burning energy producer, such a victory
would leave untouched the parties most responsible for Sail's
harm in the first place: the fossil fuel companies whose
deception of the public resulted in oil, coal, gas, and other fossil
fuels from being regulated or prohibited.
The fossil fuel industry has, for several generations now,
been insulated against regulation and tort liability by political
structures that permit most-indeed, virtually all-commercial
public deceptions because they are perpetrated by the wealthy
elite (large corporations owned and managed by ultrawealthy
shareholders and officers).266 One result of this unjust and
Clarify Responsibilities of Carbon Majors for Climate Change, GERMANWATCH (Nov. 8,
2018), [https://perma.cc/427E-S7LH].
261. See, e.g., Marcelo Leite & Lalo de Almeida, Peruvian Farmer Sues German
Energy Company, Seeks Compensation for Shrinking Glaciers, FOLHA DE S.PAULO (May
29, 2018), rhttps://perma.ec/CY6L-3UCF]; Sazl Lliuya, el Peruano que Gan6 su Primera
Batalla en Alemania, LA REPUBLICA (Mar. 29, 2018), [https://perma.cc/4Z3T-HK3N].
262. See, e.g., Dellinger, supra note 13, at 528-29; Kirsten Davis & Thomas Riddell,
The Warming War: How Climate Change is Creating Threats to Peace and Security, 30
GEO. ENVTL. L. REV. 47, 70-71 (2017); Calvin Bryne, Climate Change and Human
Migration, 8 UC IRVINE L. REV. 761, 786 (2018); Lliuya v. RWE AG, SABIN CTR. FOR
CLIMATE CHANGE L., supra note 14; Lliuya v. RWE, GRANTHAM RES. INST. ON CLIMATE
CHANGE AND THE ENV'T, supra note 16.
263. Brooke Jarvis, Climate Change Could Destroy His Home in Peru. So He Sued
an Energy Company in Germany., N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 9, 2019), [https://perma.cc/UGC9-
5AN3]; Nugent, supra note 148.
264. Jarvis, supra note 263.
265. Lliuya v. RWE AG, SABIN CTR. FOR CLIMATE CHANGE L., supra note 14.
266. David Grossman, Warming Up to a Not-So-Radical Idea: Tort-Based Climate
Change Litigation, 28 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 6, 28 (2003).
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lopsided system is the focus of this paper: the fact that fraud
laws do not touch such deceptions. Public commercial
deceptions, and particularly those that cover up slowly
destructive products like tobacco, asbestos, sugar, opioids, and
fossil fuels, almost always fall outside the bounds of how fraud
is interpreted and applied today. The fossil fuel industry's
deceptive practices and representations, as discussed in the
Introduction and in Section I.B, are completed in such a way
that virtually no harmed plaintiff could ever, under the current
law, establish reliance.
If Safil were to sue ExxonMobil for fraud in a U.S. court,
the case would likely be dismissed on the pleadings. He would
be unable to plead, much less prove, that he personally relied to
his detriment on the fossil fuel industry's misrepresentations,
and that his harm arises directly as a result of that reliance. He
could not establish actual reliance. Why? Because climate
change deception is different. The fossil fuel industry's
deceptions harm innocent victims who (1) were not targeted by
the misrepresentations, and (2) their harm flowed not from their
own reliance on the misrepresentations, but from the reliance of
others.
This is where tort law was two and a half centuries ago, but
with the action of trespass. Then, there was a large class of
culpable defendants whose intentional acts caused the plaintiffs
harm, but while the plaintiff could prove intentional tortious
conduct, the plaintiff could not prove that the defendant had
specific intent to (1) commit the particular tortious conduct that
resulted, (2) cause the particular harmful result that occurred,
and/or (3) harm or offend the plaintiff, as opposed to harming or
offending a third person. This was a gap in the law filled, first
by expanding the scope of liability for trespass cases, and later
in American law by transferred intent applied to what are now
termed the trespassory torts. 2 67
Today, we face a gap in the tort law just as wide as that one
filled in by transferred intent. The fossil fuel industry has been
misleading the public for decades about global warming. The
massive, multimillion dollar campaign of misinformation was
not merely a ploy to sell a product, but a calculated plan to close
267. Prosser, supra note 203, at 654-55.
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the public's eyes to the destruction of the climate while the very
industry causing it reaped trillions in profit. Like tobacco,
asbestos, sugar, and opioid companies, the fossil fuel
companies' commercial public deception was the central
keystone of its business; its profits were directly tied to its
ability to mislead the public into ignoring the destructiveness of
its product. ExxonMobil was one of the most profitable
companies in the world from 1917 to 2017, if not the most
profitable during this period.268
The problem is clear. ExxonMobil and other fossil fuel
companies were able to do on a global scale the very thing that
is prohibited in one-on-one dealings: make false claims about
the product it is selling in order to sell it and reap profits. This is
one of the ironies of commercial public deceptions to sell slowly
destructive products: if you sell one product to one person that
harms them, you are liable and possibly even guilty of a crime,
but sell billions of gallons of a product that poisons the entire
planet, like leaded gasoline in the twentieth century or fossil
fuels over the past half century, and you not only escape all
liability, but you are richly rewarded. You gain vast wealth.269
The gap in the law is clear. How to fill it is less so. One
option, however, is to adopt a transferred intent and reliance
doctrine in commercial public deception cases like that of the
fossil fuel industry. Why intent and reliance? In short, because
the two elements are interrelated in fraud. The intent required of
a defendant is the specific intent to mislead the intended
victim.27° The victim, in turn, must prove that she relied on the
defendant's false statement or omission to her detriment, and
that her harm flows from that reliance.
271
268. See Jeff Kauflin & Michael Noer, America's Top 50 Companies 1917-2017,
FORBES (Sep. 19, 2017), [https://perma.cc/GH74-XEAK] (showing that Exxon was the
only company to rank in the top ten most profitable companies in each of three ranking
lists, for 1917, 1967, and 2017).
269. The applicability of Jean Rostand's famous quote cannot be overlooked here:
"Kill one man, and you are a murderer. Kill millions of men, and you are a conqueror.
Kill them all, and you are a god." JEAN ROSTAND, PENES D'UN BIOLOGISTE [THOUGHTS
OF A BIOLOGIST] 116 (1939) (quotation translated from the original French to English).
270. See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Attorney Gen., 94 N.E.3d 786, 792 (Mass. 2018).
271. See id. at 792-93.
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A. Policy Support for Applying the Doctrine
Transferred intent has never, to my knowledge, been
applied in a fraud case. 272 But up until a number of decades ago,
it had never been applied in any tort case at all.273
The question whether transferred intent should be applied
to climate change fraud cases is, of course, a subjective
judgment no individual has a monopoly over. There is no right
or wrong answer. There is, however, ample policy support for
the proposition, as the very policy justifications for transferred
intent generally each apply with equal validity to the proposition
that the doctrine be applied in climate change fraud.
First, it is unquestionably fairer to make those who
purposefully deceived the public in order to sell and propagate
C02-producing fossil fuels shoulder the losses caused by the
resulting global warming than it is to put the loss on global
warming's victims who did nothing to cause, and could not have
done anything to avoid, the resulting harm. 27 4  As between an
innocent plaintiff and a guilty defendant, applying transferred
intent would "put the loss upon the one upon whom it ought in
obvious justice to fall.
275
Second, applying transferred intent and reliance to climate
change fraud cases would further the aim of tort to hold
intentional tortfeasors responsible for a wider range of
consequences than negligent tortfeasors. 276 That the campaign
of deception carried out by the fossil fuel industry was immoral
is the easiest of calls to make. If destroying the habitable
272. See Prosser, supra note 203, at 656 n. 51 (noting where courts have refused to
extend the transferred intent doctrine to "cases of pecuniary loss from deceit, where the
defendant intends to mislead one person and another relies instead"); Mark Gergen, A
Wrong Turn in the Law of Deceit, 106 GEO. L.J. 555, 618 (2018) (suggesting that perhaps a
transferred intent rule could be adopted and applied to fraud law "to allow an unintended
victim of an intended fraud to recover").
273. Johnson, supra note 225, at 912-13.
274. See Prosser, supra note 203, at 661; Johnson, supra note 225, at 911-13, 918.
275. Prosser, supra note 203, at 661.
276. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: INTENTIONAL TORTS TO PERSONS § 110
(AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 1, 2015); see also Reynolds, Jr., supra note 225, at
531; Derosier v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 130 A. 145, 152 (N.H. 1925); KEETON ET
AL., supra note 63, § 8, at 37.
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environment of Earth to get rich is not immoral, it would beg the
question of what activity could, then, possibly be immoral? The
fossil fuel industry has been, and is now, actively engineering
the destruction of the global climate, something that has
triggered a massive global extinction and is now widely
considered one of the greatest threats to the human race's
existence. 277  Because many fossil fuel companies did this
purposefully, as it is clear ExxonMobil did, imposing liability on
them through transferred intent and reliance would further the
"general principle of intentional torts that there is liability for all
the direct and natural consequences of the defendant's act.,
278
Third, the deterrence of further corporate public deceptions
also justifies imposing transferred intent and reliance liability.
279
277. See, e.g., C.J. Polychroniou, Global Warming and the Future Of Humanity: An
Interview with Noam Chomsky and Graciela Chichilnisky, ROZENBERG Q. (Sept. 2016),
[https://perma.cc/X3ZV-T4JJI.
[Noam Chomsky:] As for climate change, it's by now widely accepted by
the scientific community that we have entered a new geological era, the
Anthropocene, in which the Earth's climate is being radically modified by
human action, creating a very different planet, one that may not be able to
sustain organized human life in anything like a form we would want to
tolerate. There is good reason to believe that we have already entered the
Sixth Extinction, a period of destruction of species on a massive scale,
comparable to the Fifth Extinction 65 million years ago, when three-quarters
of the species on earth were destroyed, apparently by a huge asteroid.
Atmospheric C02 is rising at a rate unprecedented in the geological record
since 55 million years ago. There is concern-to quote a statement by 150
distinguished scientists-that "global warming, amplified by feedbacks from
polar ice melt, methane release from permafrost, and extensive fires, may
become irreversible," with catastrophic consequences for life on Earth,
humans included-and not in the distant future. Sea level rise and
destruction of water resources as glaciers melt alone may have horrendous
human consequences.
Graciela Chichilnisky: The consensus is that climate change ranks along
with nuclear warfare as the top two risks facing human civilization. If
nuclear warfare is believed to be somewhat controlled, then climate change is
now the greatest threat.
As difficult as it is to eliminate the risk of nuclear warfare, it requires fewer
changes to the global economy than does averting or reversing climate
change. Climate change is due to the use of energy for industrial growth,
which has been and is overwhelmingly based on fossil fuels.
Id.
278. Reynolds, Jr., supra note 225, at 535.
279. JOHNSON & GuNN, supra note 241, at 7; Reynolds, Jr., supra note 225, at 531;
see also The Tie That Binds, supra note 234, at 364-65 (citing Clarence Morris, Punitive
Damages in Tort Cases, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1173, 1174 (1931)).
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Companies have been working to actively deceive the public to
sell destructive products for at least a hundred years, and it is
clear such companies feel free to carry out these deceptions with
impunity. Imposing tort liability on such behavior would
disincentivize other corporate actors from continuing this
deceptive practice.
Fourth, the possible criminal nature of the commercial
public deception campaign, which mirrors to a staggering degree
the tobacco industry's campaign of misinformation found to
violate RICO as a conspiracy to defraud the public,28 ° provides a
further justification for imposing the transferred intent and
reliance expansion of liability in climate change fraud cases.281
Finally, the tort policy of holding jointly and severally
liable all participants who take part in, aid, abet, or encourage
harm-producing conduct applies particularly well to the
deceptive practices of the fossil fuel industry.2 82 It is not one
actor but a conspiracy of bad actors who work together to bring
about the resulting harm, global warming and all its effects.283
One more justification for applying a transferred intent and
reliance doctrine to climate change fraud cases can be found in
the securities fraud realm, where fraud claims can prevail
without establishing reliance.284 Federal securities fraud claim
plaintiffs are presumed to rely on all public representations by
the defendant through the doctrine of fraud on the market.285
Although this presumption can be rebutted, it is a very high bar
on defendants attempting to do so. 286 All public statements by a
publicly-owned company are deemed to be reflected in the price
of its securities at any given moment, and therefore reliance is
280. United States v. Philip Morris USA Inc., 566 F.3d 1095, 1105 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
281. See Reynolds, Jr., supra note 225, at 534; Singer v. Marx, 301 P.2d 440, 442-43
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1956); Smith v. Moran, 193 N.E.2d 466, 468 (Il1. App. Ct. 1963).
282. See Reynolds, Jr., supra note 225, at 535; see also Murphy v. Wilson, 44 Mo.
313 (1869) (providing a general discussion on the doctrine of joint and several liability);
Keel v. Hainline, 331 P.2d 397, 400-01 (Okla. 1958) (further explaining joint and several
liability).
283. Correspondence Between the Director of the Institute for Applied &
Professional Ethics and Former Exxon Employee Lenny Bernstein, OHIO UNIV.,
[https://perma.cc/VE4R-6NTF] (last visited Oct. 19, 2019).
284. Hildes v. Arthur Andersen LLP, 734 F.3d 854, 856 (9th Cir. 2013).




presumed and very often satisfied without the plaintiff having to
make any affirmative showing at all of first-party reliance.
287
New York's Martin Act,288 which is their blue skies
securities anti-fraud law, goes even further, at least with regard
to criminal fraud claims. It provides for criminal fraud liability
in total absence of reliance, 289 though civil actions under the
Martin Act do require plaintiffs establish reliance.29 °
B. Application of a Transferred Intent and Reliance
Doctrine
The transferred intent doctrine could, and I advocate
should, be applied to the intent and reliance element in climate
change fraud cases. Doing so would not only further numerous
tort policy aims and right injustice, but also, and perhaps more
importantly, update the law to reflect current society and issues.
There is no question the fossil fuel companies like ExxonMobil
purposefully misled the public about climate change, and that
they did so with the purpose of increasing sales and adding
shareholder value. There is also no doubt about the
consequences of these deceptions. Global warming is now one
of the most urgent problems we-the global we-face.
91
We also face a choice. What will we do about those who
caused our present predicament? Will we allow those who
poisoned the planet to evade liability? That was what we did
287. See Basic Inc. v. Levin, 485 U.S. 224, 246-47 (1988); Halliburton, 573 U.S. at
267-68.
288. N.Y. GENERAL BUSINESS LAW § 352 (McKinney 2019).
289. See People v. Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC, 145 A.D.3d 533, 539 (N.Y. App.
Div. 2016) (Andrias, J., dissenting) ("[T]he fraudulent practices targeted by the statute
need not constitute fraud in the classic common-law sense, and reliance need not be shown
in order for the Attorney-General to obtain relief.").
290. See People v. Essner, 479 N.Y.S.2d 127, 131 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1984) ("[1]n a
private civil action for damages, reliance is an element of the charge, for otherwise a
defendant could be held liable under [the Martin Act] even to purchasers whose damage
could not be traced to his wrongdoing.") (internal quotation marks omitted).
291. See, e.g., Matthew Moore, Climate "Sceptic" Bjorn Lomborg Now Believes
Global Warming Is One of World's Greatest Threats, TELEGRAPH (Aug. 31, 2010),
[https://perma.cc/GB5L-TU7J]; Case T-263/07, Estonia v. Comm'n, para. 49 (Ct. First
Instance, Sept. 23, 2009) (noting that global warming "represents one of the greatest social,
economic and environmental threats which the world currently faces"); Nick Bisher, New
Car Emissions Feared to Increase Global Temperatures, State Standing: Massachusetts v.
EPA, 59 MERCER L. REV. 1011, 1025 (2008) ("Global warming has grown to become
regarded as the single greatest environmental threat to mankind.").
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with regard to the leaded gasoline industry's public deceptions
about the lead it released into the environment.2 92 That is one
course of action, and based upon historical precedent, it may
very well be the most likely one.
Another option is looking closely at the laws we have and
ensuring we apply them in a way as to bring about the most just
and fair result, to protect those harmed and hold liable those
intentional wrongdoers whose acts caused the harm. Though
some advocate that this would require establishing an entirely
new tort,293 I posit here it can be accomplished by applying the
tort law already on the books, pursuant to well-established tort
policy and principles.
1. Intent
In climate change deceptions by the fossil fuel industry,
and in other commercial public deceptions like them, the intent
by the wrongdoer is nothing less than to defraud the public and
those responsible for protecting the public. Defrauding the
general public, as opposed to targeting a single individual, has
been held more morally culpable and deserving of a greater
award of damages, or even punitive damages. 294  Moreover,
schemes to defraud the public are commonly the criminal act
bases of RICO claims, including the successful RICO claim
against the tobacco industry.295
If such defendants are considered to have intended to
defraud the public at large, this also raises important standing
questions. Can a defendant defraud the public? Is a fraud claim
by one harmed by such a fraudulent scheme viable? Two courts
recently held that plaintiffs bringing fraud claims against GHG
emitters for climate change damages lacked standing to bring
292. Kat Eschner, Leaded Gas Was a Known Poison the Day It Was Invented,
SMITHSONIAN (Dec. 9, 2016), [https://perma.cc/PE5C-5 FLZ].
293. See generally Parker-Flynn, supra note 29 (suggesting how a new cause of
action would be appropriate for cases involving emissions deception).
294. See Gale v. Kessler, 461 N.Y.S.2d 295, 296 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983) ("To
recover punitive damages in an action for fraud, it must appear that the fraud was upon the
general public, that is, aimed at the public generally, is gross and involves a high degree of
moral culpability.") (internal quotation marks omitted).
295. See United States v. Philip Morris USA Inc., 566 F.3d 1095, 1105 (D.C. Cir.
2009); see also Bridge v. Phoenix Bond & Indem. Co., 553 U.S. 639, 652 (2008)
(confirming the connection between RICO claims and schemes to defraud).
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the claims. 296 The court in Comer v. Murphy Oil USA297 held
that the fraud plaintiffs there lacked standing because the fraud
claim was "a generalized grievance that is more properly dealt
with by the representative branches and common to all
consumers of petrochemicals and the American public., 298 The
court in Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp.,299 a
case where the plaintiffs did not aver common law fraud but did
aver nuisance and civil conspiracy to defraud the public,
dismissed the claims as nonjusticiable political questions.
30 0
The question of standing, although important, is beyond the
scope of this article. My focus here is on the question of how
intent should be applied in the case a plaintiff has standing in a
climate change fraud case against a fossil fuel company or a
GHG emitter. In short, my proposal is that courts apply
transferred intent as has been done with several trespassory torts
for hundreds of years. Transferred intent should apply to
climate change fraud cases.
This will, of course, increase the number of potential fraud
plaintiffs in such cases (as well it should). However, even if
fraudulent representations are considered to be aimed at the
general public, and thereby allowing claimants to satisfy this
element by transferred intent, that does not mean the class of
possible plaintiffs has no limit. There should be limits to the
scope of possible plaintiffs with regard to any individual climate
change fraud case. But it is clear from the global nature of the
campaign of misinformation and the global effects of climate
change that such limits could, and should, be difficult for a
defendant to establish. For instance, Safil Luciano Lliuya, the
Peruvian farmer suing RWE AG, clearly would be within the
scope of the foreseeable plaintiffs in a climate change fraud case
because his damages flow directly from global warming due to
296. Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 585 F.3d 855, 868 (5th Cir. 2009); Native Vill. of
Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F.Supp.2d 863, 883 (N.D. Cal. 2009), aff'd, 696 F.3d
849 (9th Cir. 2012).
297. Comer, 585 F.3d at 868.
298. Id. The court in Comer further noted, "'[N]o matter how well intended,
Plaintiffs have done little more than present a generalized grievance, common to all
citizens or litigants in [the United States], and as such, lack standing."' Id. (quoting Public
Citizen, Inc. v. Bomer, 274 F.3d 212, 219 (5th Cir. 2001)).
299. Native Vill. of Kivalina, 663 F. Supp. 2d at 868.
300. Id. at 877-78.
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CO 2 emissions. Not only does this consist of personalized harm
to him, but he is clearly a foreseeable plaintiff. ExxonMobil's
own internal documents from a decade or more before it
launched its campaign of climate change denial show the
company was aware of "potentially catastrophic events that must
be considered" with regard to how global warming would affect
the planet and human populations all around it.3°1
It is is long overdue for the law to recognize the nature of
the deception carried out by fossil fuel companies and others.
Their intent is to defraud the public. When any member of the
public is harmed, and can satisfy the other elements of the claim,
those who intended to deceive the public should be held liable
for those damages.
2. Reliance
Reliance should be, under the principles discussed above,
deemed satisfied in climate change fraud cases where (1) any
person targeted by the deception relies on it, and (2) that
person's reliance was intended or could reasonably have been
foreseen by the defendant. In the case of climate change fraud,
this would include, for instance, members of Congress and
administrators in government agencies. It was the reliance by
these individuals that ensured fossil fuels would remain
unregulated and for sale to the general public. Their reliance, as
much as if not more than that of individual members of the
public, was the primary aim of the fossil fuel industry's
campaign of climate change doubt.
Like the tobacco and sugar industries' public deception
campaigns, the fossil fuel industry depended not only on the
public remaining in the dark about the true dangers posed by its
301. See Memorandum of M.B. Glaser, Manager of Exxon Environmental Affairs
Programs, to Various Exxon Executives, at 11, 13 (Nov. 12, 1982),
[https://perma.cc/34CU-M3WP].
In addition to the effects of climate on global agriculture, there are some
potentially catastrophic events that must be considered. For example, if the
Antarctic ice sheet which is anchored on land should melt, then this could
cause a rise in sea level on the order of 5 meters. Such a rise would cause




product but also, and most importantly, on avoiding government
regulation and court liability. Reliance by these intended
targets-i.e., government officials-should be enough.
One of the primary purposes of the reliance element is to
provide a nexus between the fraudulent acts of the defendant and
the harmful results to the plaintiff.30 2 In this way, reliance plays
a similar role in fraud as the intent element in intentional torts.
It draws the line of liability from the defendant to the plaintiff.
Courts have, to date, been reluctant to dispose of this normally-
required nexus in climate change fraud cases.30 3  But, as
discussed above, imposing this required nexus in commercial
public deception cases like climate change fraud results in
harmed plaintiffs being left without recourse while intentional
wrongdoers avoid liability.
Applying this transferred reliance doctrine in climate
change fraud cases, in addition to the transferred intent doctrine
described above, would help level the playing field. It might
also, in the very near future, help avert disaster. While it is the
fossil fuel industry misleading the public about climate change
today, who knows what commercial public deceptions will be
carried out in the future. It is unknown what the next destructive
product will be. We don't know if it will harm our health or
denigrate our environment. All we know is there will be another
destructive product, and those running the company selling it
will be willing to enrich themselves by selling it at the expense
of the rest of us. It will happen again. Will the law allow it?
V. CONCLUSION
Today, some of the biggest companies in the world make
their money by misleading the public. This article takes
particular aim at ExxonMobil. But this particular company is
far from alone in utilizing lobbying and propaganda to
misleadingly sell destructive products; at the end of the day,
ExxonMobil is not the problem. The law is. Companies like
302. See In re King, 68 B.R. 569, 572 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1986) ("Civil fraud and
actionable civil fraud are not the same. Actionable civil fraud requires a nexus between the
act or omission and the alleged loss to the defrauded party. That nexus is reliance.").
303. See In re Volkswagen "Clean Diesel" Mktg., Sales Practices, & Prods. Liab.
Litig., No. 2672 CRB (JSC), 2018 WL 1142884, at *1 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (dismissing a
complaint involving fraudulent emissions reports due to lack of reliance).
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ExxonMobil owe a duty to their shareholders to maximize
profits and shareholder value. 30 4 This duty, imposed on them
not only by the economic system but also by law,30 5 ignores
externalities. It is not ExxonMobil's job to protect the
environment or human health. Perhaps it should be, but it's not.
The problem is us. We need to ask, and more importantly
answer, what kind of world we want. Are we okay with
companies knowingly causing rising sea levels and stronger and
more frequent extreme weather events while at the same time
lying to us about what they are doing and evading liability for
the harms caused? Do we want to allow companies to kill our
friends and relatives, and us, with cancer and other maladies by
selling poisonous products? Is it acceptable to us that those
whose actions cause misery, destruction, and death not only
evade liability but, indeed, grow enormously wealthy in the
process of doing these things?
I pose these questions in a way that reveals my own bias on
the subject. I, for one, prefer that harmful and destructive
actions be grounds for civil liability for any harm caused by
those actions. I prefer that those harmed by such conduct be
able to seek compensation for their loss. Like many others
today watching the global warming catastrophe unfold, I want to
see justice on this issue. That justice has so far evaded us. The
fossil fuel companies continue to enrich themselves at the
expense of current and future generations all over the globe.
They know very well what they're doing. How long will we let
this go on?
304. See In re Trados Inc. S'holder Litig., 73 A.3d 17, 20 (Del. Ch. 2013).
305. Id.
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